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                                       ABSTRACT  
Islam and Human Rights: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus 
                               
     Hossein Houshmand, Ph.D. 
     Concordia University, 2010 
 
This dissertation begins by emphasizing a distinction between 
demands of justice and requirements of human rights. In order to clarify 
this distinction, I explain two predominant views on human rights: 
humanitarianism (minimalist) and cosmopolitan egalitarianism (maximalist) 
as unsound and unreasonable views. As an alternative and proper view, I 
examine the moral and political ideas that constitute a conception of 
human rights that John Rawls presents in The Law of Peoples. I interpret 
and defend a conception of human rights which is less extensive than the 
rights that maximalists support and more expansive than minimalists 
embrace. I show how Rawls conceives the idea of human rights, which 
rights he counts as human rights and why. The first part of this dissertation 
followed with three reasons to support Rawls‟ conception of human rights: 
the principle of collective self-determination, the normative standards of 
political obligation, and the value of toleration. The essential idea of 
Rawls‟ conception of human rights is as follows: in order to gain support 
from different ethical and religious traditions, a freestanding conception of 
human rights should be presented. In the second part, I examine 
iv 
 
possibilities within Islamic doctrine to include an overlapping consensus 
on a freestanding conception of human rights. The requirement of an 
Islamic affirmation of a conception of human rights identified in three 
ideas: a distinction between the law of God and human interpretation, the 
compatibility of God‟s sovereignty and human responsibility, and diversity 
of religious communities as a will of God. I explore and justify these ideas 
by referring to contemporary Muslim intellectuals‟ works that are 
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 Global society is characterized by its philosophical, ethical and 
religious disagreements. What are the implications of the doctrinal conflict 
– the “fact of reasonable pluralism”1 – for the understanding of a 
conception of human rights? How can respect for ethical and religious 
pluralism be reconciled with the strong belief that everyone possesses 
basic human rights? Must human rights be located in a particular secular 
or religious doctrine in order to be justified? How can a conception of 
human rights be supported by a variety of ethical and religious traditions? 
In this dissertation, I deal with these questions by focusing on a particular 
conception of human rights.  
Consider the two predominant views concerning human rights 
which are familiar from the literature of contemporary political philosophy: 
humanitarianism (or minimalist) and cosmopolitan egalitarianism (or 
maximalist). The minimalist proposes the idea that human rights are 
limited to the negative rights which individuals could claim against one 
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another, even in a world without social or political institutions. 2  
Humanitarianism confines human rights to the protection of physical 
security.  
  On the other hand, the maximalist holds that human rights have 
equal standing with rights based on justice. Put differently, the 
cosmopolitan egalitarian claims that people everywhere should have the 
same rights as citizens of a liberal government claim for themselves. 
Accordingly, only a liberal democratic state can promote fulfillment of 
human rights. 
 Contrary to these typical views, in the first part of this dissertation, I 
elucidate and defend a conception of human rights which is less extensive 
than that maximalist (cosmopolitan egalitarianism) endorses and more 
expansive than minimalist (humanitarianism) embraces. This conception is 
derived from John Rawls‟ The Law of Peoples (1999).3 In LP Rawls 
expands his ideas on justice to the international society comprised of 
different “peoples” with different values and traditions. He proposes a 
                                               
 
2
 See Joshua Cohen, “Is There a Human Right to Democracy?” in The Egalitarian 
Conscience: Essays in Honor of G.A. Cohen, edited by C. Sypnowich (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 226-48. 
3
 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 




conception of human rights, as a basic component of an idea of global 
justice for a culturally plural world.  
In fact, Rawls conceives human rights as the broad requirements of 
justice that are compatible with all reasonable political moralities. He holds 
that human rights are a “proper subset” of the rights of members 
recognized and secured in any society that is (at least) “decent.” Decent 
societies include those societies which are recognized by liberal 
democracies as “equal participating members in good standing of the 
society of peoples” (LP, p. 59). Rawls makes a distinction between the 
conception of liberal justice and the idea of decency. “All liberal societies 
are decent, but not all decent societies are liberal. Human rights are 
common to all decent societies, whether they satisfy the requirements of 
liberal justice or not.”4    
 Making this distinction, Rawls demarcates “human rights proper” 
from the conception that “simply expand the class of human rights to 
include all the rights that liberal government guarantee.” These rights are 
fundamental to any “common good idea of justice” and so are not 
“peculiarly liberal or special to the Western tradition.” Therefore, according 
                                               
 
4
 Charles Beitz, “Human Rights as a Common Concern,” in Robert Goodin and Philip 
Pettit, eds., Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006), p.365. 
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to Rawls, human rights set minimal, necessary (although not sufficient 
from a liberal point of view) requirements of justice that apply to the basic 
structure of every society. Among the human rights which Rawls 
described as proper subset are as follows: “the right to life (to the means 
of subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, 
and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience 
to ensure freedom of religion and thought); to property (personal property); 
and to formal equality …” (LP, p. 65).  
These rights “play a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples5: 
they specify limits to a regime‟s internal autonomy;” only if they are 
respected can a regime be justified in claiming that other societies have 
no right to intervene in its internal affairs. They also set moral constraints 
on the conduct of war, as well as on the reasons that can justify a 
society‟s going to war. Most generally, “they set a limit to the pluralism 
among peoples.” Thus human rights play roles that are different from the 
                                               
 
5
 The term “law of peoples,” relying upon John Vincent, Human Rights and International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1986), p. 27, derives from the idea of 
jus gentium. The phrase, “jus gentium intra se” indicates what all laws have in common. 
“Rawls‟s use of the term “law of peoples” does not, however, have the same meaning. 
Rawls uses the term “Law of Peoples” to refer to those principles that regulate mutual 
political relations among peoples, not among individuals or state as such, as was 
traditionally the case with natural law and law of nations theorists.” See David Boucher, 
“Uniting What Right Permits with What Interest Prescribes: Rawls‟s Law of Peoples in 
Context,” in Rex Martin and David Reidy, eds., Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic 
Utopia (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), p. 23. 
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roles played by the rights of democratic citizenship in a liberal society; 
they are “a special class of urgent rights” (LP, p.78-81). 
According to Rawls, human rights are the primary and necessary 
conditions for social cooperation or as the requirements of membership in 
any well-ordered society. However, respect for human rights is not 
sufficient to make a society a well-ordered one. The other two conditions 
for domestic institutions must be met: first, political relationships between 
the government and the people, as well as the political relationships 
among the people, should be moral relationships, namely respecting the 
reciprocal duties of justice. Second, the members of the society should be 
granted “a meaningful role in making political decisions.” For that reason, 
Rawls thinks that benevolent absolutisms which honor human rights are 
not well-ordered “because their members are denied a meaningful role in 
making political decisions” (LP, p. 4). Rawls realizes that some other 
societies are not well-ordered as well; these are “burdened societies”6 
(which may lack the capacities necessary for taking part in international 
society), and “outlaw societies” (that may commit crimes).  
                                               
 
6
 That is “peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or 
decent political and social regime” LP, p. 37. 
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Thus, Rawls believes that there is a significant moral difference 
between “decent hierarchical societies” that are well-ordered – namely, 
their basic structure of political and legal institutions recognize and secure 
human rights – and those that are not. Given the moral importance of 
these distinctions, Rawls maintains that if a non-liberal society is governed 
in accordance with a conception of justice that requires respect for its 
members‟ basic human rights, and if its government seeks to benefit 
membership in international society governed by a Law of Peoples, then 
that non-liberal society deserves full and good standing in the international 
society and is entitled to toleration by liberal peoples. 
 In the first part of this dissertation, the idea of “human rights 
proper” is defended further by three reasons, which propose that 
standards of human rights must differ from and be narrower than 
standards that one approves for a liberal democratic society. The first is 
the principle of collective self-determination which is stated in Article 1 of 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The second is a distinction 
between justice and political obligation; the threshold of political obligation 
should be lower than is set by justice. Finally, the value of toleration, which 
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indicates that a decent hierarchical society (non-democratic) can have a 
moral character that liberal societies are morally obligated to tolerate.7 
 
  In the second part, I will examine contemporary Islamic 
intellectualism and the challenge of human rights. Given the central idea 
of Rawls‟ account of human rights in which a conception of human rights 
should be freestanding, that is, a conception of human rights suitable for a 
pluralistic world must be independent from different philosophical, ethical 
or religious doctrines.  Such a conception must serve as the object of an 
overlapping consensus among different ethical and religious traditions. Yet 
the endeavor of showing that the idea of human rights can be endorsed by 
different ethical and religious traditions may require revision or 
reconstruction of these traditions by their adherents. To illustrate this point 
about the reconstruction or revision of an ethical and religious tradition in 
order to win an overlapping consensus on a freestanding conception of 
human rights, I want to examine the most reasonable enterprises in 
contemporary Islamic thought for the reconciliation of Islamic doctrine and 
human rights.  
                                               
 
7
 See Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?” 
The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 12, no. 2 (2004): pp. 211-212.  
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I will explore a variety of Muslim intellectuals‟ endeavors concerning 
the issue. The common conceptual characteristic of the Islamic 
intellectualism is that: a religion does not necessarily continue to depend 
on a particular socio-historical context. Therefore, Islamic doctrine can be 
reconstructed to make it compatible with the new social and political order. 
In so doing, some of the Muslim intellectuals emphasize the primary 
universal values, such as self-determination, toleration, pluralism and 
religious freedom, and use these values as a way in which a conception of 
human rights could be included in Islamic doctrine. Many of them make 
the argument that “God‟s original intent was consistent with extended 
rights for human beings, but that the socio-historical experiences were 
unable to achieve a fulfillment of such intent.” 8   However, some of them 
argue that justice as the core value in Islamic doctrine requires respect for 
human diversity and recognition of human rights.  
The Muslim intellectuals‟ affirmation of a conception of human 
rights is ultimately formulated in three ideas: the idea of distinction 
between Divine law and human interpretation; the idea of compatibility 
                                               
 
8
 See Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Human Rights Commitment in Modern Islam,” in Human 
Rights and Responsibilities in the World Religion, eds., J. Runzo, N. Martin, and A. 




between God‟s sovereignty and human responsibility; finally, the idea of 
diversity of religious communities as a will of God.  
                                           ***         
In this dissertation, my aim is not to explore the widespread 
intellectual endeavors to support the idea that religious statements shape 
our current moral discourse, the conception of justice and the idea of 
human rights. I am not concerned with various arguments for 
indispensability of religion in justifying the idea of human rights. Instead, 
my aim is to interpret and defend an attractive idea that the different 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines can endorse an independent 
conception of human rights. 
In so doing I will explain a conception of human rights (derived from 
LP) in the light of Rawls‟ moral and political philosophy which is presented 
in his masterpieces: A Theory of Justice9 and Political Liberalism. Rawls‟ 
political philosophy is involved in what has been called constructive 
interpretation.10 It requires that a theory of justice be limited within the 
                                               
 
9
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
press, 1999). 
10
 For an elaboration of this term see Aaron James, “Constructing Justice for Existing 
Practice: Rawls and the Status Quo,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 33, no. 3 (July 
2005), pp. 281-316. 
10 
 
boundaries of political or social practices of any particular society, but not 
with the most abstract elements. A constructivist conception of justice 
represents the principles of justice not as part of some abstract moral 
rules known through theoretical reason, but rather as “the outcome of a 
procedure of construction” founded in practical reasoning. Rawls argues 
that reasoning about what justice demands should proceed from the social 
practices which are already established.11 He maintains that among the 
many existing social practices, we should attend to the most basic existing 
social structures (i.e., major institutions) because their effects are “so 
profound and present from the start.”12 According to Rawls, the institutions 
of a modern democracy aims at creating social “primary goods” (i.e., 
liberty and opportunity, income, wealth and the bases of self-respect) as a 
scheme of cooperation among citizens for mutual advantage. Similarly, 
international law and institutions are aimed at creating “goods” such as 
peace, national autonomy, and maintaining basic domestic justice as a 
scheme of cooperation among societies for mutual recognition.13 Given 
this Rawls‟ methodology in political philosophy, his conception of human 
                                               
 
11
 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2001), p. 53. 
12
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 7. 
13
 Aaron James, “Constructing Justice for Existing Practice: Rawls and the Status Quo,” 
p, 287. Rawls says that mutual respect is an “essential part of the basic structure . . . of 
the Society of Peoples.” Rawls, LP, p. 122. 
11 
 
rights is part of an answer to the question of what principles of justice must 
be applied in a global order.   
             
However, Rawls‟ theory of global normative order in LP has 
confronted some objections, in particular from cosmopolitan egalitarians 
who accuse him of betraying his own liberal egalitarian commitments. In 
fact, they express different kinds of criticisms against Rawls‟ idea, such 
as: (1) he fails to acknowledge a more robust principle of international 
distributive justice; (2) he is concerned with justice between societies 
rather than with justice within societies; (3) his examination of international 
justice begins incorrectly with “ideal theory;” (4) his idea of global order is 
too accommodating to non-democratic peoples; and (5) his conception of 
human rights is too thin and must be substituted with a more liberal and 
egalitarian idea.14   
                                               
 
14
 See also D. Reidy, “Rawls on International Justice: A Defense‟, Political Theory, 
Vol.32, no.3 (2004), pp. 291–319. Among the critics of  Rawls‟s theory of global order 
are: Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) Chap. 3; Thomas W. 
Pogge, “Do Rawls‟s Two Theories of Justice Fit Together?”, pp. 206-226; Alistair M. 
Macleod, “Rawls‟s Narrow Doctrine of Human Rights”, pp. 150-169, both in Rex Martin, 
and David Reidy, eds., Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2006); Andrew Kuper, Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice and 
Representation in Global Institutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 8-
25; Charles Beitz,“Human rights and the law of peoples,” pp. 193-214; Martha 
Nussbaum, “Women and Theories of Global justice: Our Need for New Paradigms,” pp. 
147-177, both in D.K Chatterjee, ed., The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distance 
12 
 
On the other hand, the defenders of Rawls‟ LP argue that Rawls 
has simply extended his commitment to toleration to the global context in 
which cooperation between independent peoples is a moral requirement. 
Without recognizing the moral requirement for social cooperation on the 
international level, it is difficult to understand how the cosmopolitans‟ 
commitments to liberal ideals can reasonably encourage the types of 
societies Rawls calls decent. As Rawls says, “… liberal peoples should 
not suppose that decent societies are unable to reform themselves in their 
own way. By recognizing these societies as bona fide members of the 
Society of Peoples, liberal peoples encourage this change” (LP, p. 61).  
The defenders of Rawls have focused upon various arguments in 
LP, such as: Rawls‟ claim that there is no obligation of distributive justice 
among societies; his idea that the basic human right does not require a 
democracy; his idea to extend the argument of democratic peace to 
decent hierarchical peoples, that is, decent peoples deserve respect 
because they would not pose a particular threat to world peace (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
Needy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Simon Caney, 
„„Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples,‟‟ The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol.10, 
no. 1 (2002), pp. 95–123; John Tasioulas, „„From Utopia to Kazanistan: John Rawls and 
the Law of Peoples,‟‟ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 22, no. 2 (2002), pp. 367–396; 
Kok-Chor Tan, Toleration, Diversity and Global Justice (Pennsylvania: Penn State 
University Press, 2000), Chap. 4.  
13 
 
peace argument) and so on.15 However, the central idea of Rawls‟ account 
of human rights, that is, a conception of human rights should be presented 
freestanding, has largely been ignored. This dissertation is primarily 
devoted to analysis of the idea of freestanding conception of human rights 
and to show that how this conception could gain an overlapping 










                                               
 
15
 The good examples of the defenders of Rawls‟ LP are as follows: Alyssa Bernstein, 
“Human Rights, Global Justice and Disaggregated States: John Rawls, Onora O‟Neill and 
Marie Slaughter,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 66, no. 1 (2007), pp. 87–111; 
Joseph Heath, “Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defence,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy Supplementary Volume, ed. Daniel Weinstock (Lethbridge: University of 
Calgary Press, 2007); Joshua Cohen, “Is There a Human Right to Democracy?” in  C. 
Sypnowich, ed., The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honor of G.A. Cohen (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 226-48; Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism About 
Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 
12, no. 2 (2004), pp. 190-213; Samuel Freeman, “The Law of peoples, Social 
Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive justice,” Social Philosophy & Policy 
Foundation, Vol. 23, no, 1 (2006), pp. 26-68; Mathias Risse, “What We Owe to the Global 
Poor,” in G. Brock and D. Mellendorf, eds., Current Debates in Global Justice (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2005), pp. 81-118; David Reidy, “Rawls on Human Rights: A Brief Defense,” 
Southwest Philosophy Review, Vol.19, no. 1 (2003), pp.147–59; Christ Brown, “The 
Construction of a “Realistic Utopia”: John Rawls and International Political Theory,” 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, no.1 (2002),pp. 5–21; Leif Wenar, “The 
Legitimacy of Peoples,” in P. DeGreiff, and C. Cronin, eds., Global Justice and 
Transnational Politics (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 53–76. See also several 
articles in Rex Martin, and David Reidy, eds., Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic 


































HUMAN RIGHTS AND RAWLS’ THEORY OF GLOBAL ORDER 
 
My purpose is to consider if, in political society, there can be any 
legitimate and sure principles of government, taking men as they are and 
laws as they might be. I will always try in this inquiry to bring together 
what right permits with what interest prescribes, so that justice and utility 
do not find themselves at odds with one another.                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 




I contend that this scenario is realistic – it could and may exist. I say it is 
also utopian and highly desirable because it joins reasonableness and 
justice with conditions enabling citizens to realize their fundamental 
interests.  
 







 Since the end of World War II, there has been a profound change in 
moral thinking about war and the powers of sovereignty. War is now 
commonly regarded as justified only for reasons of self-defence or in order 
to protect human rights in grave violations.18 The limits on powers of 
                                               
 
16
 Jean Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, in The Basic Political Writings, trans. 
D.A Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), p. 141.  
17
 Rawls, LP, p. 7.  
18
 Although the moral arguments upon rights and wrongs of conducts of war within ethical 
traditions (the issue of just and unjust war) have a long history, but wars and foreign 
interventions in the pre-modern world have occurred mostly for interest in political 
domination, territorial acquisition, or the like. Interventions for humanitarian purposes 
seem to be a relatively new phenomenon, although a most controversial one: “The 
controversial issue that remains is not whether the Security Council should act to end 
massive violations of human rights. In principle, there appears to be agreement that it 
16 
 
sovereignty are a “fundamental departure from the Westphalian 
conception of sovereignty that ruled from the mid-17th century to the end 
of World War II.”19 Many of the ethical grounds to restrict the permissible 
means and ends of war, as well as to limit the powers of sovereignty, are 
now stated in terms of human rights. Thus, in contemporary international 
law and practices, human rights have come to play the roles of restricting 
the justifying reasons for war and its conduct and of specifying limits on 
the internal autonomy of a regime.20    
 In this context, the term “human rights” is sometimes used to refer 
to purported rights, or to claims that lack appropriate moral justification, or 
to rights that cannot play the relevant roles. In order to clarify the points 
that relate to the content of human rights, the basis of justification, and 
their roles, in this chapter I will briefly examine two typical views about 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
should. The problem is the difficulty of obtaining the necessary consensus within the 
Security Council in any given case.” Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights in 
Context: Law, Politics, Morals, p. 652. For a classical study on just war theories and for 
the arguments on war against “failed states” for ending massive violations of human 
rights, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Arguments with Historical 
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 
19
 Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?” p. 
195.  
20
 See Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations 
for International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Chris Brown, 
Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2002); Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999). 
17 
 
human rights: humanitarianism (minimalist) and cosmopolitan 
egalitarianism (maximalist). As a reasonable alternative to these views, I 
will explain John Rawls‟ theory of global normative order and its 
requirements for a conception of human rights.    
 
I. The Minimalist and Maximalist Views of Human Rights 
1. The Minimalist View (Humanitarianism) 
According to humanitarianism (minimalist), human rights should be 
understood as the “negative rights” that individuals could claim against 
one another even in a world without social and political institutions.21 For 
instance, John Simmons identifies human rights in this way:  
Human rights are rights possessed by all human beings (at all 
times and in all places), simply in virtue of their humanity. ... [They] 
will have the properties of universality, independence (from 
social or legal recognition), naturalness, inalienability, non-
forfeitability, and imprescriptibility. Only so understood will an 
account of human rights capture the central idea of rights that 
can always be claimed by any human being.22 
 
                                               
 
21
 See Joshua Cohen and Charles Sable, “Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 34, no. 2 (2005), pp. 147 – 175. 
22
 John Simmons, Justification and legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 185. 
18 
 
A widespread account of humanitarianism is an interpretation of the 
idea of natural rights, such as Lockean natural rights, understood as 
moral rights that individuals would enjoy in “a pre-institutional state of 
nature.” According to this view, claims for human rights which are 
dependent on institutions, such as rights to political participation, 
education, and health care, are best articulated as a reference to the 
interests rather than a statement of rights. 23 
However, as Charles Beitz argues, the rights rooted in natural 
rights theories and human rights found in international morality do not 
belong to the same conceptual category. The theory of natural rights 
was developed to restrain the use of a government‟s coercive power 
in circumstances of religious diversity. The great assumption that lies 
behind the natural rights was the idea that “a central problem of 
political life is the protection of individual freedom against threat of 
tyranny.” According to Beitz, a realistic reading of the modern social 
and political history shows that the incentive of international human 
rights could not have such limited concern. He maintains that human 
rights of the international declarations have a larger target; they 
describe and assert social conditions for a flourishing human life. The 
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statements of human rights expect “a more ambitious assumption of 
responsibility for the public sphere than was required by the 
motivating concerns of classical natural rights theories.”24  
In this way, as Joshua Cohen argues, “the content of natural rights, 
for their non-institutional setting, is necessarily restricted.”25 In fact, the 
minimalism confines human rights to protect physical security.26 Given the 
Lockean theory of natural rights, it would be difficult for humanitarianism to 
explain the institutional based human rights, such as the right to fair legal 
process and the right of political participation. As a result, “the concepts of 
natural rights and human rights are fundamentally different.” And this 
significant difference has been demonstrated in the several rights 
articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
later Covenants including “right to a fair hearing,” and right to political 
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participation which presupposed the institutional contexts.27 In a “pre-
institutional state of nature” none of these rights can be reached.28 
 
2. The Maximalist View (Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism) 
The second typical view of human rights –the predominant mood 
among contemporary political philosophers– is cosmopolitan 
egalitarianism (maximalist). The maximalist view holds that human rights 
have an equal measure with rights originated from justice. On this view as 
a “monistic” theory of morality, a single set of basic standards of justice 
always applies to individuals everywhere, regardless of background 
conditions.29 In other words, cosmopolitan egalitarian claims that “people 
everywhere stand to one another” in the same way that citizens of a liberal 
democratic society do: “they have the same rights and the same 
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opportunities.”30 Accordingly, human rights require a liberal democratic 
state. Finally, the maximalist regards all the rights enumerated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and later conventions, as genuine 
human rights.  
One of the most important accounts of cosmopolitan egalitarianism 
is Charles Beitz‟s theory of international politics. Beitz argues in favor of 
global application of the two principles of Justice as Fairness, the 
conception of justice which John Rawls presents in A Theory of Justice; 
he says that “it is wrong to limit the application of contractarian principles 
of social justice to the nation-state; instead, these principles ought to apply 
globally.”31  
On the contrary, Rawls emphasizes that “justice as fairness is 
framed for a democratic society”32 and its primary subject is the basic 
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structure (the major social and political institutions) of a domestic society. 
A just basic structure is a scheme of cooperation among free and equal 
individuals. In an initial situation – which Rawls calls “original position” – 
representatives of free and equal individuals are sited in fair conditions for 
choosing the terms of social cooperation.  
According to Rawls, two principles of justice would be selected in 
the original position. The first principle, namely, “the principle of equal 
basic liberties,” requires protection for liberty of conscience, free speech 
and freedom of association, liberty and integrity of the person, and rights 
of political participation. In other words, the first principle contains the 
requirement of political equality. The second principle indicates that social 
and economic inequalities are permissible only if they satisfy two 
conditions. First, conditions of “fair equality of opportunities;” the principle 
says that people who have similar talent and motivation should have equal 
chances to achieve desirable positions. Second, “the difference principle” 
states that social and economic inequalities ought to work to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society. A just social order 
that secures equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity might yet 
suffer from significant inequalities. The difference principle tells us that 
23 
 
inequalities are morally acceptable only if they bring the maximum benefit 
to the worst-off members of society.33  
 Justice as Fairness, as Rawls argues, is a theory for the 
institutions of the domestic society, but some Rawlsian cosmopolitan 
egalitarians, such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, believe that this 
theory should be extended to the global context. Accordingly, there should 
be principles of distributive justice in a global setting similar to the 
principles of justice as fairness in domestic society. They argue that there 
is an international basic structure similar to domestic basic structure, with 
political and economic institutions associating citizens of different 
countries – as citizens of the world – together in a global scheme of social 
cooperation.34   
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In fact, the cosmopolitan egalitarians defend a global original 
position in which each “world citizen” has a representative. They argue 
that a “globalized difference principle” will be endorsed in this global 
original position – that is, socio-economic inequalities are permissible 
“only if these inequalities work to the greatest benefit of the world‟s worst-
off” individuals.35 Both Beitz and Pogge, particularly argue that the huge 
inequalities in global income and wealth require a significant change in the 
world‟s economic institutions.36    
The central argument of Beitz‟s theory of a global normative order 
runs contrary to the classical idea of the morality of states. The argument 
indicates that the moral legitimacy of states does not derive from 
themselves, but from their role in achieving justice. In fact, Beitz assumes 
that principles of morality of state are founded upon the value of personal 
autonomy, according to which “…individuals are entitled to form and 
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pursue their own conceptions of what makes life worth living.”37 In other 
words, the moral importance of states derives from the degree of 
individual autonomy that provide for their citizens. As Beitz writes:  
Assuming that it is part of the justice of institutions that they treat 
their members in some sense as autonomous persons, then the 
claim that unjust states should not be accorded the respect 
demanded by the principle of state autonomy follows from the claim 
that it is only considerations of personal autonomy, appropriately 
interpreted, that constitute the moral personality of the state.38 
 
Thus, Beitz argues that, not all states can claim a right of internal 
autonomy (i.e., the moral significance of state): “only states whose 
institutions satisfy appropriate principles of justice can legitimately demand 
to be respected as autonomous sources of ends.”39 So a state‟s internal 
autonomy is limited and conditional, and its limits and conditions are 
determined by the principles of justice. It is important to note that, Beitz 
does not distinguish between principles of domestic justice and conditions 
of government legitimacy. Therefore, in his opinion, intervention in another 
state‟s affairs for the sake of justice can be morally permissible. Beitz 
                                               
 
37
 Jeremy Waldron, “Moral Autonomy and Personal Autonomy,” in Autonomy and the 
Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 315.   
38





emphasizes that there may be “some warrant for interference in another 
state‟s affairs when the state‟s institutions are unjust according to 
appropriate principles of justice and the interference would promote the 
development of just domestic institutions within the state.”40 
In a similar vein, Thomas Pogge in Realizing Rawls41 argues that a 
Rawlsian liberal must endorse global application of the two principles of 
Justice as Fairness, equal right to basic liberty and fair equality of 
opportunity. He holds that these principles would be chosen by the parties 
in a global original position. Thus, Justice as Fairness should be 
globalized by “viewing the parties as immediately addressing the world at 
large and dealing with the organization of national societies only within the 
context so provided.”42 And he asserts that if we have “Rawlsian 
commitments,” in particular, if we share Rawls‟ reasons for regarding all 
human beings as free and equal moral persons, and for focusing on the 
basic structure, then “we should assess the justice of our global 
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institutional scheme by reference to the worst representative share it tends 
to generate.”43  
Pogge presents his position as an interpretation and defense of 
Article 28 of the UDHR: “Everyone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be 
fully realized” (emphasis in the original).44 When assessing the global 
institutional framework from a moral point of view, we should be 
concerned, “first and foremost, with its least advantaged participants, 
those in our world who lack well protected fundamental rights and liberties 
(as stipulated for example, by the Universal Declaration or by Rawls‟s first 
principle in its amended form)”. Pogge proposed an amendment to 
Rawls‟s first principle as that it forbids radical social and economic 
inequalities involving extreme poverty. Therefore, he favors a global order 
under which basic rights and liberties would be better protected. 
Both Beitz and Pogge characterize themselves as cosmopolitan 
liberals. Each describes cosmopolitan liberalism differently, but each 
defines his own approach as opposed to Rawls‟ idea of global normative 
order. Beitz contrasts his own cosmopolitan liberalism with a position he 
                                               
 
43
 Ibid., p. 259. 
44
 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, pp. 239. 
28 
 
calls social liberalism, which attributes this later view to Rawls. According 
to Beitz, social liberalism is “probably the majority view among political 
philosophers who have thought about international political theory.” Its 
central feature is that “domestic societies or peoples are taken as having 
non-derivative moral significance.” Cosmopolitan liberalism, by contrast, 
“does not take societies as fundamental;” instead, it “takes the well-being 
of individuals as fundamental” and interprets “the values of society as 
derivative,” and it regards “the reform of institutional structures, both 
domestic and international, as an instrument for the satisfaction of the just 
interests of individual persons rather than for the improvement of societies 
per se.”45 
According to Pogge, three factors are shared by all cosmopolitans:  
First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, 
or persons - rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or 
religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of 
concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or 
citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern 
attaches to every living human being equally - not merely to some 
subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, 
generality: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate 
units of concern for everyone - not only for their compatriots, fellow 
religionists, or suchlike (emphasis in the original).46  
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Pogge then distinguishes legal from moral cosmopolitanism: 
 
Legal cosmopolitanism is committed to a concrete political ideal of 
a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rights 
and duties - are fellow citizens of a universal republic. Moral 
cosmopolitanism holds that all persons stand in certain moral 
relations to one another. We are required to respect one another‟s 
status as ultimate units of moral concern - a requirement that 
imposes limits on our conduct and, in particular, on our efforts to 
construct institutional schemes. This view is more abstract, and in 
this sense weaker than, legal cosmopolitanism.47 
 
In sum, Pogge‟s distinction between legal (strong) and moral 
(weak) cosmopolitanism indicates that strong cosmopolitans require that, 
as agents, we should admit equal duties or equal responsibilities to 
everyone in the world,48 while weak cosmopolitans suggest that people 
have special obligations to fellow nationals or fellow citizens. As David 
Miller shows, the cosmopolitanism is in fact reduced to the claim that we 
owe people something as a matter of justice, regardless of national 
boundaries.49 So, cosmopolitanism in this weak sense is simply the claim 
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that there are global duties of justice, duties owed by one human being to 
another that go beyond borders.50 
Miller argues that the weak (moral) version of cosmopolitanism – 
which is formulated in terms of a principle of equal moral worth or equal 
moral concern – “can be accepted by almost anybody – excepting a few 
racists and other bigots.”51 Thus, one may say that John Rawls‟ LP can be 
included in the moral version of cosmopolitanism. 52 Just because Rawls 
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insists the honoring of human rights and the duty of assisting peoples 
living under unfavorable conditions among the principles of justice that 
should govern “Society of Peoples.” 
 
In the rest of this chapter, I will examine Rawls‟ theory of global 
normative order as the foundation for a conception of human rights. I will 
explain Rawls‟ idea of a people and his distinction between liberal and 
“decent” peoples. Finally, I will briefly discuss the requirements of respect 
for human rights.  
 
II. The Society of Peoples 
 
In LP Rawls argues against attempts of the Rawlsian 
cosmopolitans in extending the principles of Justice as Fairness to the 
global context.53 In contrast to the cosmopolitans‟ assertion that the 
ultimate concern of their view “is the well-being of individuals and not the 
justice of societies,” what is significant to LP, Rawls says, “is the justice 
and stability for the right reasons of liberal and decent societies, living as 
members of a society of well-ordered Peoples” (LP, pp. 119-20). 
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  Rawls‟ aim here is twofold: he wants to give an account of the role 
of human rights and of the form that toleration of non-liberal societies must 
take from the perspective of liberalism “extended to the law of peoples,” to 
prove that his liberal Law of Peoples is acceptable globally– to both well-
ordered liberal and non-liberal but decent peoples – and to prove that a 
society need not be liberal in order to respect human rights.54  
Rawls describes the two fundamental motivating ideas of LP as 
follows:  
One is that the great evils of human history – unjust war and 
oppression, religious persecution and the denial of liberty of 
conscience, starvation and poverty, not to mention genocide and 
mass murder – follow from political injustice, with its own cruelties 
and callousness. … The other main idea, obviously connected with 
the first, is that, once the gravest forms of political injustice are 
eliminated by following just (or at least decent) social policies and 
establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these great 
evils will eventually disappear (LP, pp. 6-7). 
 
Rawls‟ idea of the Law of Peoples includes three essential 
characteristics: first, the idea of people, second, the liberal and decent 
peoples, and finally the idea of global public reason. In the following pages 
I examine these characteristics.  
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1. The Idea of People 
The “basic units of moral concern” in the global normative order 
might be understood in three ways: “global society as a society of 
individuals, a society of peoples, and a society of states.”55 Rawls 
supports the view that the basic unit (or agents) in the global order is a 
society of peoples. A distinctive feature of it is that there are the principles 
must be endorsed by the agents for the global order – what Rawls called 
the “Law of Peoples.” 
The idea of a people, however, has three “basic features”: 
institutional, cultural, and moral. The first feature, the institutional feature, 
shows that a people has a government with a set of legal and political 
institutions that represents its people‟s interests; “reasonably just … 
government that serves their [people‟s] fundamental interests”: protecting 
their territory; preserving their political institutions, culture, independence, 
and self-respect as a corporate body; and ensuring the safety, security, 
and well-being of their citizens (LP, pp. 23–9, 34–5). The second feature, 
the cultural condition, indicates that each peoples are also culturally 
“united by what Mill called „common sympathies‟;” Rawls clearly means by 
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this an idea of nationality, generally based on “a common language and 
shared historical memories” (LP, pp. 23–5). And finally, the people has a 
moral nature, meaning that the political society is regulated by a 
conception of justice, and that the people is prepared to cooperate with 
other peoples on reasonable terms (LP, pp. 23–5, 61–8). Rawls says 
peoples with these three features differ from the societies he refers to as 
states:  
How far states differ from peoples rests on how rationality, the 
concern with power, and a state‟s basic interests are filled in. If 
rationality excludes the reasonable (that is, if a state is moved by 
the aims it has and ignores the criterion of reciprocity in dealing 
with other societies); if a state‟s concern with power is predominant; 
and if its interests include such things a converting other societies 
to the state‟s religion, enlarging its empire and winning territory, 
gaining dynastic or imperial or national prestige and glory, and 
increasing its relative economic strength – then the difference 
between states and peoples is enormous (emphasis in the 
original)(LP, pp. 28-29). 
 
  Two characteristics of Rawls‟ account of the idea of the peoples are 
important. The first is that, peoples are considered as reasonable in 
addition to being simply rational (LP, 25).56 This idea is opposed to the 
idea standardly used in political science (particularly in realist 
international-relations theory) that states as the rational collective agents 
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are merely pursue their own interests.57 Making a distinction between a 
liberal people and a liberal state, Rawls further elaborates the idea: 
A difference between liberal peoples and states is that just liberal 
peoples limit their basic interests as required by the reasonable. In 
contrast, the content of the interests of states does not allow them 
to be stable for the right reasons: that is, from firmly accepting and 
acting upon a just Law of Peoples. Liberal peoples do, however, 
have their fundamental interests as permitted by their conceptions 
of right and justice. They seek to protect their territory, to ensure 
the security and safety of their citizens, and to preserve their free 
political institutions and the liberties and free culture of their civil 
society. Beyond these interests, a liberal people tries to assure 
reasonable justice for all its citizens and for all peoples; a liberal 
people can live with other peoples of like character in upholding 
justice and preserving peace (LP, p. 29). 
 
The second characteristic indicates that a significant interest of a 
people is not being treated with indignity and contempt but with respect by 
other peoples: “altogether distinct from their concern for their security and 
safety of their territory, this interest shows itself in a people‟s insisting on 
receiving from other peoples a proper respect and recognition of their 
equality” (LP, p.35).  
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As Rawls argues in Justice as Fairness, when citizens in a 
democracy consider the question of the justice of their society‟s basic 
structure, they are to think of themselves and each other only as free and 
equal moral persons, and they are to offer terms of cooperation that they 
sincerely believe the others might reasonably accept.58 Similarly, in LP 
when determining what terms of cooperation would be fair, peoples are to 
employ a criterion of reciprocity appropriate to the kind of social 
cooperation in question (LP, 25).59 Rawls writes: 
It is…part of a people‟s being reasonable and rational that they are 
ready to offer to other peoples fair terms of political and social 
cooperation. These fair terms are those that a people sincerely 
believes other equal peoples might accept also; and should they do 
so, a people will honor the terms it has proposed even in those 
cases where that people might profit by violating them. Thus, the 
criterion of reciprocity applies to the Law of Peoples in the same 
way it does to the principles of justice for a constitutional regime 
(LP, p. 35).   
 
According to Rawls, each citizen of a well-ordered society would 
ideally have the two moral powers necessary to be cooperating members 
of society. These moral powers include a capacity for a sense of justice (to 
understand, apply, and act from principles of justice) and a capacity for a 
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rational conception of the good (to form, revise, and pursue a rational 
conception of the good). Rawls calls these powers the capacities to be 
reasonable and to be rational.60 In a well-ordered democratic society, the 
citizen assumes that every member of the society is a free and equal 
moral person and thus regards each member of the society as entitled to 
the same basic political and legal rights as any other citizen. In LP the 
parallel of the idea of a citizen is the idea of a people: a people is well-
ordered in accordance with a conception of justice and also is a non-
expansionist non- aggressive society. Thus a people is motivated to take 
part in a fair social cooperation among well-ordered societies. It requires 
that a people has the necessary and the sufficient ground of entitlement to 
equal rights and respect.61  
 
2. Liberal and Decent Peoples  
The second essential characteristic of the Law of Peoples is a 
distinction between liberal and decent peoples. A liberal people holds a 
conception of justice that assigns equal rights – personal and political – to 
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citizens, and that regards citizens as free and equal persons. By contrast, 
a decent people does not endorse a liberal conception of justice; instead, 
it is based on a “common good idea of justice” and regards individuals as 
basically members of groups (LP, pp. 64-65). Although a common good 
idea of justice ensures basic rights to all members, it does not guarantee 
the same rights for all individuals as one finds in liberal democracies.  
In spite of the above-mentioned difference, utilizing the idea of an 
original position, Rawls argues that the parties representing liberal and 
non-liberal (but decent) peoples would endorse the proposed principles of 
the Law of Peoples as constituting the moral basis of international law and 
as applying to international relations among all societies (LP, pp. 10, 32-
33, 39-43, 58). The proposed principles are as follows:  
(1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and 
independence is to be respected by other peoples. 
(2) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
(3) Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind 
them. 
(4) Peoples are to observe the duty of non-intervention. 
(5) Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate 
war for reasons other than self-defense. 
(6) Peoples are to honor human rights.  
(7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the 
conduct of war. 
(8) Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under 
unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent 
political and social regime (LP, p.37). 
 
 
 In the first step of his argument, Rawls states that the parties are 
rational representatives of liberal peoples behind a veil of ignorance. This 
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veil deprives the parties of knowledge about the societies they each 
represent, including the size of its territory, its level of economic 
development, its natural resources, its population, and how powerful it is 
as compared to other societies. What they do each know is that they 
represent a liberal democratic people.62 
Rawls maintains that in the second-level original position, the 
representatives of liberal peoples debating how to interpret the two 
traditional powers of sovereignty (concerning war and internal autonomy), 
should ask themselves:  
What kind of political norms do liberal peoples, given their 
fundamental interests, hope to establish to govern mutual relations 
with nonliberal peoples? Or what moral climate and political 
atmosphere do they wish to see in a reasonably just Society of 
well-ordered Peoples? (LP, p. 42). 
The answer is that the two powers of sovereignty should be limited, thus 
the representatives of liberal peoples would choose an interpretation of 
the eight principles of LP according to which the freedom and 
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independence of peoples, as declared in principle (1), and the duty of non-
intervention, as declared in principle (4), are restricted by the requirement 
to honor human rights, as stated in principle (6); also principle (5) is 
interpreted as permitting humanitarian military intervention in grave cases 
(LP, p. 42).  
In the second step of the argument, Rawls suggests criteria for a 
decent society and argues that rational representatives of decent non-
liberal peoples in an original position behind a veil of ignorance would 
endorse the same interpretation of the proposed principles as endorsed by 
the rational representatives of liberal peoples. In fact, Rawls‟ argument for 
the principles of LP depends on his conceptions of the fundamental 
interests of decent peoples, non-liberal and liberal (LP, 40-41).  
The fundamental interests of free and democratic liberal peoples 
give them reason to seek the benefits of social cooperation among 
peoples. And they seek to gain these benefits by cooperating in 
accordance with a criterion of reciprocity. Rawls states that,  
[L]iberal peoples have a certain moral character. Like citizens in 
domestic society, liberal peoples are both reasonable and rational, 
and their rational conduct, as organized and expressed in their 
elections and votes, and the laws and policies of their government, 
is similarly constrained by their sense of what is reasonable. As 
reasonable citizens in domestic society offer to cooperate on fair 
terms with other citizens, so (reasonable) liberal (or decent) 
peoples offer fair terms of cooperation to other peoples. A people 
will honor these terms when assured that other peoples will do so 
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as well. This leads us to the principles of political justice in the first 
case and the Law of Peoples in the other (LP, p. 25). 
 
Rawls also argues that decent non-liberal societies are “well-
ordered” and the parties representing these societies – in an original 
position – are “rational and moved by appropriate reasons,” (LP, p. 63). 
They “do not engage in aggressive wars; therefore their representatives 
respect the civic order and integrity of other peoples” and thus would 
“accept the symmetrical situation (the equality) of the original position as 
fair.” He further explains that in virtue of their common good conception of 
justice, “the representatives strive both to protect the human rights and the 
good of the peoples they represent and to maintain their security and 
independence.” In addition, the representatives “care about the benefits of 
trade and also accept the idea of assistance among peoples in time of 
need” (LP, p. 69). Rawls argues that if decent societies accept the 
proposed principles, these societies should be considered by liberal 
societies “as bona fide members of a reasonable Society of Peoples” (LP, 
p. 84).  
However, Rawls realizes that the particular societies may lack the 
capacities necessary for taking part in a Society of Peoples, or may 
commit crimes: these are “burdened societies” and “outlaw regimes.” 
“Benevolent absolutisms” seem to be an intermediate case, insofar as 
they pose no threat to other states and secure human rights domestically, 
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yet are not well-ordered societies. Rawls describes benevolent absolutism 
as securing “human rights” or “most human rights” (but not rights of 
political participation) (LP, pp. 4, 63, 92). Well-ordered Peoples may 
pressure the “outlaw regimes” to observe the Law of Peoples (LP, p.93) 
and have duties of assistance toward the “burdened societies.” Here 
Rawls, in contrast whit cosmopolitan egalitarians, argues that, 
It does not follow, however, that the only way, or the best way, to 
carry out this duty of assistance is by following a principle of 
distributive justice to regulate economic and social inequalities 
among societies. Most such principles do not have a defined goal, 
aim, or cut-off point, beyond which aid may cease. The levels of 
wealth and welfare among societies may vary, and presumably do 
so; but adjusting those levels is not the object of the duty of 
assistance (LP, p. 106). 
 
 
In so doing, Rawls limits duties to the burdened societies in helping 
them to build their own institutions.63 The aim of such duty of assistance 
is:  
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[T]o help burdened societies to be able to manage their own affairs 
reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members of 
the Society of well-ordered Peoples. This defines the “target” of 
assistance. After it is achieved, further assistance is not required, 
even though the now well-ordered society may still be relatively 
poor (LP, p. 111). 
 
3. The Idea of Global Public Reason 
The third essential characteristic of the Law of Peoples is the idea 
of public reason: the society of peoples is guided by reasons that can be 
shared by different peoples, and that its content is provided by the 
principles of the Law of Peoples (LP, pp. 55- 57, 121). In order to 
determine how the ideal of a peaceful world – in which the human rights of 
all persons are respected – could be realized, Rawls first rejects the goal 
of a world state:  
I follow Kant‟s lead in Perpetual Peace (1795) in thinking that a 
world government – by which I mean a unified political regime with 
the legal powers normally exercised by central governments – 
would either be a global despotism or else would rule over a fragile 
empire torn by frequent civil strife as various regions and peoples 
tried to gain their political freedom and autonomy (LP, p. 36). 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
Economic Development,” 
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He then tries to develop a conception of a just order of politically 
independent peoples which could, realistically, be achieved. It is a 
conception of peaceful relations among peoples, which each of them are 
both well-ordered by its own conception of justice and motivated to deal 
justly with other peoples. Since such peoples differ in their moral character 
from states, Rawls refers to them using the term “Society of Peoples.” 
Rawls maintains that they would follow the principles of the Law of 
Peoples as the basis of public political reasoning in their dealings with 
each other (LP, p. 55). 
Rawls first considers the idea of a Society of Peoples in which all 
societies are liberal-democratic peoples. In A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism, Rawls has argued that a just and stable liberal-
democratic society is realistically possible. In LP he addresses the 
question of whether just and stable relations among such societies would 
be realistically possible (LP, p, 11, 124-26). He presents of arguments in 
support of the claim that such a Society of Peoples would be realistically 
possible. The first argument – the argument of democratic peace – 
focuses on the empirical and historical facts explaining why well-
established democracies have not gone to war with each other and 
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probably will not do so.64 The second argument aims to show that liberal 
peoples have reason to support peace and justice internationally by 
following the principles of the Law of Peoples. This argument makes 
appeal to the idea of public reason. 
Public reason is a basis for political reasoning that all can share; it 
comprises “public justifications for political and social institutions – for the 
basic structure of a political and social world” – that can be offered to and 
accepted by all.65 Rawls characterizes his own political conception of 
justice (Justice as Fairness) as giving one of the various possible forms to 
the content of public reason for a constitutional democracy. Such form of 
public reason is a conception of justice that expresses political values that 
can be shared by all free and equal citizens, thus, a citizen can deliberate 
within framework of a conception of justice in the sincere belief that the 
political values it expresses can be endorsed by other citizens.66  
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The Law of Peoples specifies a form of public reason for a Society 
of Peoples, which has been termed “global public reason.”67 Here the 
assumed just social world is not a well-ordered constitutional democracy, 
but an order of politically independent peoples. Peoples are well-ordered 
societies meeting various conditions including moral ones that Rawls calls 
the criteria of decency (LP, pp. 23-25). Unlike states as described by 
Realist theories of international relations (LP, pp. 46-48), decent peoples 
are motivated to realize the ideal of a Society of Peoples by following its 
public reason, and their domestic institutions meet certain minimum moral 
standards, including respect for basic human rights (LP, pp. 64-67). 
Some important implications of the idea of global public reason are 
following: first, the public reason reflects the virtue of toleration. This 
indicates that liberal peoples do not insist that the content of the global 
public reason corresponds to the principles of a liberal conception of 
justice, that is, do not insist that those principles should be applied to all 
societies (LP, p. 59). The second implication is that the terms of argument 
among peoples would be shared; thus, the global public reason should not 
depend on a conception of citizens as free and equal persons. Therefore, 
its terms can be accepted by both liberal and non-liberal decent peoples 
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(LP, p. 57). Finally, the idea of global public reason is a matter for 
treatment of other peoples – both liberal and decent non-liberal – as equal 
cooperators. It specifies cooperation within the principles of the Law of 
Peoples. Political societies are to apply the principles as practical 
guidelines and regulations for their conduct and institutions (LP, p. 42).  
 
III. The Requirement of Respect for Human Rights 
 Given the above brief explanation of Rawls‟ theory of global 
normative order, we can understand that why Rawls includes in the Law of 
Peoples a principle requiring respect for human rights. 
As we have seen, among the principles that Rawls sets for the Law 
of Peoples are the principles that specify moral reasons for restricting the 
permissible ends and means of war, as well as moral reasons for setting 
limits to the states‟ sovereignty. Rawls believes that war is justified only for 
reasons of self-defence or in order to protect human rights in extreme 
cases, and that human rights specify limits to a regime‟s internal 
autonomy (LP, p. 79). If a government systematically violates the human 
rights of its own people, it should be regarded as an “outlaw” and “may 
be subjected to forceful sanctions and even to intervention” (LP, p. 
81) by the liberal and decent peoples. Also the idea of human rights 
can serve as restrictions on the “reasons for war and its conduct” 
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(LP, 79). In a morally acceptable global order, war may be waged 
only against another state in self-defence or to secure human rights 
of the peoples as violated by their own state. Therefore, wars cannot 
justly be waged in the interest of maintaining military superiority or 
access to economic resources, or to expand national territory, which 
historically have been the primary reasons for warfare (LP, 94-97).  
Thus, human rights as a significant standard should be honored by 
a reasonable Law of Peoples. According to Rawls, the idea of human 
rights has three primary roles within the Law of peoples:  
1. Their fulfillment is a necessary condition of the decency of a 
society‟s political institutions and of its legal order. 
2. Their fulfillment is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful 
intervention by other peoples, for example, by diplomatic and 
economic sanctions, or in grave cases by military force. 
3. They set a limit to the pluralism among peoples (LP, p. 80). 
Because of the special roles Rawls ascribed to human rights 
for ensuring social cooperation within the Society of Peoples, he did 
not include among them all the moral rights of persons. The peoples, 
who ensure only human rights but not all liberal rights satisfy a 
criterion of decency, even though they are not just from the liberal 
moral perspective (LP, 78, 83). But for Rawls, decency is an 
important subject of political morality since it is sufficient for a people 
to enjoy the rights to self-determination and non-intervention (LP, p. 
83). An implication of Rawls‟ idea of global order is that the Society 
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of Peoples can be just whether all of its members are just (from the 
liberal point of view) or not (LP, p. 70).68 As a result, the task of the 
Society of Peoples is to ensure basic human rights of all peoples and 
not “to enforce the liberal rights of democratic citizenship among all 
peoples.”69 Achieving democratic justice should be left to the self-
determination of each politically independent people (LP, pp.61, 85). 
As we have seen, the main concern of LP is the problem of how to 
minimize war while at the same time securing individual basic human 
rights through law and protecting and promoting representative 
government. According to Rawls‟ theory of global normative order, world 
peace can be justly maintained only if a political conception of justice 
applicable to global order and can be endorsed by all societies that satisfy 
certain minimal criteria of social justice, which he calls the criteria of 
decency. These societies would form an association of well-ordered 
societies (a Society of Peoples) based on a law of peoples. Rawls also 
argues that it is necessary to formulate a reasonable law of peoples in 
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order to settle disagreements about which rights should be regarded as 
human rights.  
As Rawls estates, “the criterion of reciprocity applies to the Law of 
Peoples in the same way it does to the principles of justice for a 
constitutional regime” (LP, p. 35).  In fact, LP extends to international 
political relations the same fundamental political values expressed in 
Justice as Fairness. In LP the parallel of the idea of a citizen is the idea of 
a people: a people is well-ordered in accordance with a conception of 
justice and also is a non-expansionist non- aggressive society. Thus a 
people is motivated to take part in fair social cooperation among well-
ordered societies. It requires that a people has the necessary and 
sufficient ground of entitlement to equal rights and respect. However, 
while LP is based on the same fundamental political values as Justice as 
Fairness, it does not require non-liberal societies to adopt liberal-
democratic political system.  
Finally, in LP Rawls develops a moral justification for “two basic 
and historically profound changes in how the powers of sovereignty have 
been conceived since World War II.” The first is that “war is no longer an 
admissible means of government policy and is justified only in self-
defense, or in grave cases of intervention to protect human rights.” The 
second is that “a government‟s internal autonomy is now limited” (LP, p. 
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79). Rawls offers a moral justification for these changes by arguing that no 


















CHAPTER 2            
                 
     THE IDEA OF POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
We must always start from where we now are, assuming that we have 
taken all reasonable precautions to review the grounds of our political 
conception and to guard against bias and error…. The idea of realistic 
utopia reconciles us to our social world. 
                                                                                                                                            
John Rawls (LP, p. 121). 
 
In this chapter, I examine a conception of human rights which is 
less extensive than the rights that the maximalist view (cosmopolitan 
egalitarianism) endorses and more expansive than the minimalist view 
(humanitarianism) embraces. This account, which is derived from Rawls‟ 
LP, affirms rights to a reasonable standard of living, health and education 
and a form of accountable political system, although not a right to 
democracy.  
This conception of human rights as a part of the Law of Peoples 
should be understood as resting on the ideas of Rawls‟ later political 
philosophy. Both the Law of Peoples and Justice as Fairness are political 
conceptions of justice, and together they constitute “political liberalism” 
(LP, p. 55). As Rawls says, the Law of Peoples is “a political conception of 
right and justice” (LP, p. 3).  In order to understand what this means, I will 
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briefly examine the idea of freestanding (political) conception of justice – 
which is explained in Political Liberalism, then I will explore the idea of a 
political conception of human rights in LP, and how Rawls associates it 
with the idea of “decency” and a “decent society.” 
 
I. The Freestanding Conception of Justice  
In A Theory of Justice70 (hereinafter, Theory), Rawls proposed an 
ideal of a well-ordered democratic society based on the agreement on a 
conception of justice embedded in the virtue of fair cooperation among 
citizens as free and equal persons. In his second book, Political 
Liberalism71 (hereinafter, Liberalism), Rawls realized how in Theory he 
had not taken the fact of reasonable pluralism seriously enough. In 
Theory, the conception of justice as fairness was dependent on a 
comprehensive liberal philosophy of life that only citizens who affirm it 
would have reason to endorse Justice as Fairness. In Liberalism, 
however, Rawls asks whether Justice as Fairness can be released from 
this dependence; can views that do not agree on the fundamental moral 
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principles, nevertheless agree on a political and not metaphysical 
conception of justice?72 Liberalism defends this possibility by arguing that 
achieving an overlapping consensus on the political conception of justice 
under conditions of ethical, religious and philosophical disagreement is 
quite feasible.73    
I will now briefly explain the three fundamental ideas of Liberalism 
that specify sufficient conditions for a well-ordered society, that is, the idea 
of a political conception of justice, the idea of an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines on this political conception, and the 
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1. The Idea of Political Conception of Justice 
              The most important characteristic of a just and well-ordered 
liberal democratic society is to be regulated by a political conception of 
justice. In Rawls‟ definition, a political conception of justice has three 
distinct features: First, its subject is the basic structure of a society. 
Second, it is presented as a freestanding notion, and “The third feature of 
a political conception of justice is that its content is expressed in terms of 
certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of 
a democratic society.”75  
A political conception of justice is presented as a freestanding view 
in the sense that it is “expounded apart from, or without reference to,” any 
particular comprehensive doctrine. A comprehensive doctrine is a moral 
doctrine that applies to a wide range of moral subjects, not only to the 
basic structure of society, and includes ideals of personal character and of 
relationships of various kinds; if it is fully comprehensive, it covers all of 
the virtues and all of the values of human life. Rawls assumes that “all 
citizens [in a well- ordered liberal society] affirm a comprehensive doctrine 
to which the political conception they accept is in some way related,” and 
he conceives the political conception of justice they accept as “a module, 
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an essential constituent part, that fits into and can be supported by various 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society regulated 
by it.” Although the political conception is justifiable by reference to these 
doctrines it is not presented as derived from any of them, or as an 
application of any of them to the basic structure of society.76  
Such a freestanding conception of justice rests on Rawls‟ 
assumption that there are certain deeply well-established ideas and 
principles that citizens share in a constitutional democracy, whatever their 
conceptions of the good. However, in Theory, Rawls underestimated the 
diversity of ethical and religious perspectives. Because of the conditions of 
a liberal democracy, there is no realistic possibility that the members of 
even a well-ordered society will ever come to agree on the foundations of 
justice, or on any particular conception of good.77 So “if the role of a con-
ception of justice is to be practically conceived – as aiming to supply a 
basis for public arguments all can accept – then other bases for 
agreement must be found.”78 
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 Rawls thus argues that justice as fairness is a conception founded 
on what he calls “fundamental intuitive ideas” about freedom, equality, and 
fairness latent “in the public culture of a democratic society.”79 So political 
ideas and conceptions do not presuppose the truth of and do not belong to 
any single comprehensive doctrine; instead, they may be found in a 
democratic society‟s public political culture.  
In discussing the third feature of a political conception of justice, 
Rawls first explains what he means by the public political culture of a 
democratic society. He continues by distinguishing it from the “background 
culture” of civil society in which various associations and organizations 
and different comprehensive doctrines arrange the citizens‟ daily lives. 
Finally, he explains how justice as fairness illustrates this feature: 
justice as fairness starts from within a certain political tradition and 
takes as its fundamental idea that of society as a fair system of 
cooperation over time, from one generation to the next. This central 
organizing idea is developed together with two companion 
fundamental ideas: one is the idea of citizens (those engaged in 
cooperation) as free and equal persons the other is the idea of a 
well-ordered society as a society effectively regulated by a political 
conception of justice. We suppose also that these ideas can be 
elaborated into a political conception of justice that can gain the 
support of an overlapping consensus.80  
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The justification of Justice as Fairness is complete with the 
achievement of an “overlapping consensus.” Such a consensus can be 
achieved when adherents of various comprehensive ethical and religious 
doctrines endorse Justice as Fairness on moral grounds.81  
 
2. The Idea of Overlapping Consensus 
Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, the idea of overlapping 
consensus aimed at explaining how the political conception of justice can 
remain stable over time. To put it differently, how is it possible for the 
political conception of justice to win support from different reasonable 
ethical and religious doctrines, so that adherents to those doctrines can be 
morally motivated to do what the political conception requires? The idea of 
overlapping consensus assumes that reasonable citizens in a well-ordered 
society can endorse the political conception in accordance with the ideas 
and values latent in their comprehensive views.82 For example, Kantians 
may endorse the political conception of justice as a precondition of the 
autonomous moral agency, while Christians, Jews and Muslims may 
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support the same political conception as a precondition for fulfilling 
divinely imposed obligations.83   
            In so doing, the idea of an overlapping consensus offers a twofold 
argument for a political conception of justice. The first is the idea that 
reasonable citizens can support the political conception in terms of “public 
reason,” the reasons and ideas embedded in democratic political culture. 
The second is this assumption that reasonable citizens can also affirm the 
political conception founded on non-public reasons that derive from their 
distinct comprehensive doctrines. When all the reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines fulfill this second stage, then there is an overlapping 
consensus.84  
In Political Liberalism, Rawls illustrates the development of an 
overlapping consensus on the political conception of justice with a brief 
discussion of how Catholics and Protestants achieved an overlapping 
consensus on the principle of toleration. The principle of religious 
toleration, which was primarily accepted in order to put an end to religious 
conflict, gradually came to be accepted by Protestants and Catholics for 
moral reasons. Although in sixteenth century the acceptance of the 
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principle of toleration was a mere modus vivendi, not an overlapping 
consensus: since “both faiths held that it was the duty of the ruler to 
uphold the true religion and to repress the spread of heresy and false 
doctrine.” 85 Rawls thinks that the long experience of social cooperation 
with those of other religions ultimately diminished hostility between 
Catholics and Protestants and removed the obstacles to moral acceptance 
of the principle of toleration. Similarly, we might conjecture that different 
reasonable religious and ethical traditions that have long flourished in a 
democratic culture will come to embrace the basic intuitive ideas and 
political values on which Justice as Fairness is founded. 86  
           
3. The Idea of Public Reason  
          The third fundamental idea of Political Liberalism is the idea of 
public reason. If a conception of justice functions as a basis for the public 
political deliberation, therefore it should be interpreted in accordance with 
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the “principles of reasoning and rules of evidence” available to the 
common reason of democratic citizens.87 Rawls states that, 
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which 
all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their 
common human reason.88  
 
            The idea of public reason has two essential features: the first is the 
fundamental political questions to which it applies; they are questions of 
“constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.”89 Constitutional 
essentials concern the general form of government and political processes 
as well as the equal basic political rights and liberties of citizens. Matters 
of basic justice have to do with the basic structure of society and, in 
particular, how it ought to respond to social and economic inequalities. 
“The second feature is the persons to whom the idea of public reason 
applies; they are persons who lead discussions of the fundamental 
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political questions in the public political forum.”90 Rawls defines this forum 
as follows:  
[It] may be divided into three parts: the discourse of judges in their 
decisions, and especially of the judges of a supreme court; the 
discourse of government officials, especially chief executives and 
legislators; and finally, the discourse of candidates for public office 
and their campaign managers, especially in their public oratory, 
party platforms, and political statements.91  
 
            Rawls argues that public reason specifies an ideal conception of 
citizenship for a constitutional democratic regime. It is a normative ideal: it 
imposes on citizens “a moral, not a legal duty – the duty of civility” that 
restrains the way in which citizens should deliberate about the 
fundamental questions of their political life.92 But how can citizens support 
the ideal and fulfill the duty? Judges, chief executives, legislators and 
candidates for public office can fulfill their duty if they “act from and follow 
the idea of public reason and explain to other citizens their reasons for 
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supporting fundamental political positions in terms of the political 
conception of justice they regard as the most reasonable.”93 And how can 
citizens who are not government officials obey the duty of civility? One of 
the obligations of all democratic citizens is that they should try to “be ready 
to explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each could 
reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with their 
freedom and equality.”94              
          In this way, Rawls argues, a reasonable political conception of 
justice is needed in order to constitute “the content of public reason” and 
to make public reason “complete.”95 For public reason to be completed, it 
is required that the meaning of competing political values be decided in 
accordance with a political conception, and not simply in accordance with 
citizens‟ or officials‟ own ethical and religious views. When judges, 
legislators, and citizens appeal to comprehensive doctrines to make 
political decisions that are not acceptable by a reasonable political 
conception, other citizens are manipulated for reasons they could not 
                                               
 
93
 Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” p. 576. 
94
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.218. See also Quinn, “Religious Citizens and Public 
Reason,” p. 189. 
95
 Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in LP, pp. 144-145.  
64 
 
accept on the basis of their shared view as democratic citizens.96 
Therefore, citizens are treated as subjects and not as free and equal 
persons. The idea of public reason, thus, specifies shared moral and 
political values in order to generate public deliberation and to make 
constitutional democratic government work.97 
 
II. The Idea of Political Conception of Right 
In LP, Rawls asserts that his Law of Peoples “is developed within 
political liberalism and is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for 
a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples” (LP, p.9). In so doing, Rawls 
attempts to provide “a particular political conception of right and justice 
that applies to principles and norms of international law and practice” (LP, 
p. 3). The question which this conception answers is the following: how 
can the conception of Justice as Fairness, elaborated in Political 
Liberalism for a liberal democratic society, be plausibly “extended” to the 
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global level – to an international society comprised of different “peoples” 
with different values and traditions?98   
In LP Rawls aspires to present a “political conception of human 
rights” – as a part of an idea of global justice – for a culturally plural world. 
As I have explained in the previous chapter, this conception of human 
rights is also a part of an idea of global public reason: a shared basis for 
political argument which expresses a common reason that adherents of 
conflicting philosophical, ethical and religious traditions can be expected to 
share (LP, p. 68). In the rest of this chapter, I will explain such a 
conception of human rights.  
 
1.  Human Rights Proper  
 Human rights – in Rawls‟ view – imply the normative standards that 
must be met by any “decent” society. In other words, he conceives human 
rights as minimal and necessary – but not sufficient from the point of view 
of liberalism – requirements of justice that apply to the basic structure of 
any well-ordered society (LP, p. 61). These rights are fundamental to any 
“common good idea of justice” and so are not “peculiarly liberal or special 
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to the Western tradition” (LP, p. 65). Thus, Rawls says, “political (moral) 
force” of human rights “extends to all societies and they are binding on all 
peoples” (LP, p. 80). But it does not require that they must be enjoyed 
everywhere in virtue of the common humanity or as citizenship rights in 
the sense of “rights as trumps” common to liberal legal theories.99 
Instead, Rawls argues that human rights are common to all peoples, since 
they are compatible with all reasonable political morality, including those 
of both “liberal” and “decent hierarchical” peoples.  
The list of human rights honored by both liberal and decent 
hierarchical regimes should be understood universal rights in the 
following sense: they are intrinsic to the Law of Peoples and have a 
political (moral) effect whether or not they are supported locally (LP, 
p. 80). 
 
Therefore, according to Rawls, “human rights are distinct from 
constitutional rights from the rights of liberal democratic citizenship.” 
Human rights are “a special class of urgent rights, such as freedom from 
slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and 
security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.” These rights 
“play a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples: they restrict the 
justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a 
                                               
 
99
 See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, “Rights as Trumps,” in Jeremy Waldron, ed., 
Theories of Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984) pp. 153-67.  
67 
 
regime‟s internal autonomy” by setting “a necessary, though not sufficient, 
standard” for the decency of a society‟s political institutions and legal 
order. Although a society‟s having a government that secures human 
rights is not sufficient to make it a decent society, but is sufficient to make 
it morally unjustified any attempts by the governments of other societies to 
use diplomatic or economic sanctions or military force to change its 
domestic institutions. Finally, human rights set a limit to pluralism among 
peoples. As a result, human rights play roles that are different from the 
roles played by the rights of democratic citizenship in a liberal society (LP, 
pp.78-81).   
In Rawls‟ view, human rights are “a proper subset of the rights” (LP, 
81) founded on justice, and particularly are distinct from the conceptions 
that “simply expand the class of human rights to include all the rights that 
liberal government guarantee” (LP, p. 78). Rawls specifies these rights as 
follows:           
Among the human rights are the right to life (to the means of 
subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery, 
serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of 
liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought); to 
property (personal property); and to formal equality as expressed 
by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be treated 
similarly) (LP, p.65). 
 
 Rawls, however, does not regard this list of human rights as 
complete and comprehensive, but instead as a brief summary of “human 
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rights proper,” which he distinguishes from certain purported human rights 
that are asserted in international declarations (LP, p. 80, n.23). Of the 30 
Articles of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948 (UDHR), Rawls thinks that Articles 3 to 18 may fall under the 
category of human rights proper, “pending certain questions of 
interpretation” (LP, p. 80, n.23). These include the central elements of 
due process and the rule of law (Articles 6-12 and 17); the right to 
refuse nonconsensual marriage (Article 16); a right against cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment and against torture (Article 5); the 
right to seek asylum (Article 14); the right to a national identity (Article 
15); and the right to freedom of movement (Article 13).  He regards the 
special conventions on genocide (1948) and on apartheid (1973) as 
obvious implications of these rights (LP, p. 80, n.23). Rawls also makes 
it clear that the rights of minority populations must be respected in 
the law of peoples (LP, p. 38). Moreover, although the principles of 
the law of peoples may not prohibit gender discrimination in social 
and political life, Rawls insists that women have the basic human 
rights to have their interests represented in the procedure of 
consultation and to express dissent which might lead “to important 
reforms in the rights and role of women” (LP, pp. 75, 78).100 
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Rawls also includes the right to personal property and to 
subsistence among social and economic rights. He understands 
subsistence as a right to a “minimum economic security” including 
“general all-purpose economic means” sufficient to make “sensible 
and rational exercise” of the liberties afforded in a political society 
(LP, p 65, note.1). Importantly, he also says that all peoples have a 
“duty of assistance” to ensure that the basic needs of all members of 
society are met and that these needs must be understood in terms of 
the economic means as well as institutional resources necessary for 
them “to take advantage of the rights, liberties, and opportunities of 
their society” (LP, p. 38, fn # 47).  
   However, among the Articles of the UDHR that Rawls disqualifies; 
he explains that some, for example, Article 1, “seem more aptly described 
a stating liberal aspirations,” while others, for example, Articles 22 (which 
expresses a right to social security) and 23 (which speaks of a right to 
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equal pay for equal work and of a right to join trade unions), “appear to 
presuppose specific kinds of institutions” (LP, p. 80, note 23). In addition, 
Rawls disqualifies many of the economic and social rights affirmed by 
the UDHR. He intentionally excludes the right to holiday with pay 
(Articles 24); the right to education directed at “the full development 
of human personality” (Article 26) or the right “to enjoy the arts and 
to share in scientific advancement” (Article 27). He also does not 
include on his list of proper human rights, the full liberal right to 
freedom of expression (Article 19), and the right to democratic 
political participation (Article 21). Rawls disqualifies these Articles 
because he conceives human rights as the broad requirements of justice 
that can be satisfied by the various political systems, not only by a 
constitutional democracy.  
Broadly speaking, Rawls‟ “human rights proper” represent the 
moral core each of the six categories of rights enumerated in the 
UDHR and the two Covenants.  These categories include: (1) rights 
concerning the security and integrity of persons, (2) rights respecting 
basic individual freedoms, (3) rights regulating political participation, 
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(4) due process rights insuring non-arbitrary state action, (5) equality 
rights, and (6) social and economic rights.101  
But, where is Rawls‟ “human rights proper” derived from? In A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls presents his main principles of justice as follows: 
“All social values liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the 
social bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone‟s 
advantage.”102 He then applies the term “primary goods” to these social 
values, and argues that a democratic society‟s basic structure is fair to all 
citizens, only if it distributes equal shares of primary goods to each citizen. 
The primary goods are products of cooperation among the members of a 
single society. In LP, the parallels to the primary goods of justice as 
fairness are products of cooperation between the society of peoples (LP, 
p.41); they include (I) societies‟ security from the threats of other societies; 
(2) societies‟ recognition of, and respect for, each other‟s political 
independence and property rights; (3) societies‟ recognition of each other 
as having the juridical power to take part in treaties; (4) societies‟ 
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assurance to each other of at least the minimum of resources necessary 
to secure human rights domestically; and (5) a people‟s security versus 
the abuse of power by its own government (LP, p.37). 
 These principles are parallels the primary goods of justice as 
fairness in virtue of their relation to the fundamental interests of peoples. 
Rawls determines what the fundamental interests are by considering the 
idea of fair social cooperation among well-ordered societies. He employs a 
normative idea of a participant in such social cooperation, namely, “the 
idea of decent peoples.” In Justice as Fairness, too, he employs a 
normative idea of a participant in fair social cooperation of the relevant 
kind, namely the idea of a citizen of a well-ordered society who has an 
appropriate sense of justice; and this normative “idea of the person” 
shapes his conception of citizens‟ fundamental interests (LP, p. 55, 87-
88).  
In this way, the central focus of social and political cooperation 
in Rawls‟ Justice as Fairness is once more represented in his 
account of human rights. Here human rights are “recognized as 
necessary conditions of any system of social cooperation,” (LP, p. 
68) whether liberal-democratic or non-liberal-democratic. In other 
words, human rights are conceived as the minimal freedoms and 
protections that the members of any society need for the most basic 
practice of “the moral powers necessary to engage in social 
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cooperation”103 and take part – as a member – in a political society. 
Peoples who are denied human rights are not cooperating in any 
way; instead (like slaves) they are compelled or manipulated.  
A social system that violates these rights [i.e. human rights] cannot 
specify a decent scheme of political and social cooperation. A slave 
society lacks a decent system of law, as its slave economy is driven 
by a scheme of commands imposed by force. It lacks the idea of 
social cooperation (LP, p.65). 
 
What we can conclude, so far, is that a decent society is a system 
of political and social cooperation. Its laws are not mere commands 
imposed by force, but instead “impose bona fide moral duties and 
obligations on all persons” within the territory of the society, which all the 
members of the people recognize as fitting with their common good idea 
of justice (LP, pp. 65, 66). In contrast with a slave society, a decent 
society‟s common good idea of justice assigns and protects human rights 




                                               
 
103
 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 20. 
74 
 
III. A Decent Society and its Criteria  
Rawls‟ account of the idea of political conception of human rights is 
thus linked to the conception of a decent society. Now let me briefly 
explain what are Rawls‟ criteria of decency and his description of an 
imaginary decent society. 
 
1.  the Criteria of Decency 
 According to Rawls, the decency of a society‟s political and legal 
system is the necessary conditions for social justice; therefore, any society 
structured according to an idea of justice, whether liberal or non-liberal 
would recognize and secure human rights (LP, 87-88). Rawls defines two 
criteria of decency as follows:  
(1) First, the society does not have aggressive aims, and it 
recognizes that it must gain its legitimate ends through diplomacy 
and trade and other ways of peace (LP, p.64).       
  A society meeting this first criterion is one that “respects the 
political and social order of other societies.” Either it does not seek to 
increase its power relative to other societies, or if it does, “it does so in 
ways compatible with the independence of other societies, including their 
religious and civil liberties.” This condition entails that if a society has a 
comprehensive doctrine, whether religious or secular, which influences the 
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structure of its government and its social policies, this doctrine should 
support “the institutional basis of its peaceful conduct.” A society meeting 
this criterion thus differs from “the leading European states during the 
religious wars of 16th and 17th centuries” (LP, p. 64, all of the quotations in 
this paragraph). 
(2) The second criterion has three parts.  
(a) The first part is that a decent hierarchical people‟s system of 
law, in accordance with its common good idea of justice, secures 
for all members of the people what have come to be called human 
rights.  
(b) The second part is that a decent people‟s system of law must be 
such as to impose bona fide moral duties and obligations (distinct 
from human rights) on all persons within the people‟s territory.  
(c) Finally, the third part of the second criterion is that there must be 
a sincere and not unreasonable belief on the part of judges and 
other officials who administer the legal system that the law is 
indeed guided by a common good idea of justice… (LP, pp. 65-67). 
 
In defining the idea of decency and in deduction of its criteria, 
Rawls says that just like the idea of the reasonable in political liberalism: 
[T]here is no definition of decency from which the two criteria can 
be deduced. Instead we say that the two criteria seem acceptable 
in their general statement. I think of decency as a normative idea of 
the same kind as reasonableness, though weaker (that is, it covers 
less than reasonableness does). We give it meaning by how we 
use it (LP, p.67). 
 
Rawls gives an “account” of decency which, he says, “is developed 
by setting out various criteria and explaining their meaning” (LP, p.67). 
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The reader has to judge whether a decent people, as given by the 
two criteria, is to be tolerated and accepted as a member in good 
standing of the Society of Peoples. It is my conjecture that most 
reasonable citizens of a liberal society will find peoples who meet 
these two criteria acceptable as peoples in good standing. Not all 
reasonable persons will, certainly, yet most will (LP, p.67). 
 
 Here, it seems that Rawls does not offer an independent 
justification for his criteria of decency in order to support his claim that a 
decent hierarchical society should be tolerated by liberal societies. One 
may say that he merely defines the criteria of decency by considering the 
example of Kazanistan, which he thinks liberals should regard as a non-
liberal society eligible for toleration. But, as I will argue in the third chapter, 
Rawls in fact offers arguments independent of the example of Kazanistan 
in support of his criteria of decency and his conception of human rights. 
But in the meantime, let me summarize what he says about Kazanistan.  
 
2. A Decent Hierarchical Society 
 Rawls defines the criteria of decency by considering the example of 
an imaginary society Kazanistan which, he thinks, liberals should regard 
as a non-liberal society entitled to toleration and to recognition as a 
member of the Society of Peoples (LP, p. 79).  
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 Kazanistan is a Muslim society, but a decent non-liberal society 
need not be religious, Rawls says, “[m]any religious and philosophical 
doctrines with their different ideas of justice” (LP, p.64) may lead to 
institutions satisfying the conditions of decency.104 In Kazanistan religion 
and state do not separate. The favored religion is Islam, so only Muslims 
can hold high political and legal positions. However, other religions are not 
only tolerated, but encouraged “to have a flourishing cultural life of their 
own and to take part in the civic culture of the wider society” (LP, p. 76).105 
This idealized decent Islamic society is characterized by its enlightened 
treatment of non-Islamic religions, believing that “all religious differences 
between peoples are divinely willed,” that “punishment for wrong belief is 
for God alone,” and that different religious communities should respect 
one another (LP, p. 76, fn # 17).106 In addition, the rulers of Kazanistan 
have not aggressive aims against their neighbors, since they deny military 
interpretations of jihad in favor of a moral and spiritual one (LP, p. 76). 
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Furthermore, Kazanistan satisfies the second criterion of decency, 
because its political and legal system constitutes a “decent consultation 
hierarchy” (LP, p. 64). This is a type of basic structure that a decent 
society could have. Rawls maintains that all decent hierarchical societies 
are “associationist in form: that is, the members of these societies are 
viewed in public life as members of different groups, and each group is 
represented in the legal system by a body in a decent consultation 
hierarchy,” or in an equivalent basic structure that gives “a substantial 
political role to its members in making political decisions” (LP, p.64). 
Although the members of a decent hierarchical society do not have the 
same equal political rights as the citizens in a democratic society (LP, pp, 
66, 83), they do each have some political rights, and the system as a 
whole serves to secure certain fundamental interests for each member.  
 In Kazanistan, “each person engages in distinctive activities and 
plays a certain role in the overall scheme of cooperation”, and everyone 
belongs to a group represented by a body in the political system (LP, 
p.72). There is “a family of representative bodies whose role in the 
hierarchy is to take part in an established procedure of consultation and to 
look after what the people‟s common good idea of justice regards as the 
important interests of all members of the people” (LP, p.71). Rawls further 
elaborates this idea: 
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In political decisions a decent consultation hierarchy allows an 
opportunity for different voices to be heard... . Persons as members 
of associations, corporations, and estates have the right at some 
point in the procedure of consultation (often at the stage of 
selecting a group‟s representatives) to express political dissent, and 
the government has an obligation to take a group‟s dissent 
seriously and to give a conscientious reply.... [T]he dissenters are 
not required to accept the answer given to them; they may renew 
their protest, provided they explain why they are still dissatisfied, 
and their explanation in turn ought to receive a further and fuller 
reply. Dissent expresses a form of public protest and is permissible 
provided it stays within the basic framework of the common good 
idea of justice (LP, p.72). 
 
 Kazanistan‟s consultation hierarchy satisfies six conditions or 
guidelines. The first three are intended to ensure that the fundamental 
interests of all groups are consulted and taken into account.107 
First, all groups must be consulted. Second, each member of a 
people must belong to a group. Third, each group must be 
represented by a body that contains at least one of the group‟s own 
members who know and share the fundamental interests of the 
group. …Fourth, the body that makes the final decision – the rulers 
of Kazanistan – must weigh the views and claims of each of the 
bodies consulted, and, if called upon, judges and other officials 
must explain and justify the rulers‟ decision. In the spirit of the 
procedure, consultation with each body may influence the outcome. 
Fifth, the decision should be made according to a conception of the 
special priorities of Kazanistan. Among these special priorities is to 
establish a decent and rational Muslim people respecting the 
religious minorities within it. ...Sixth and last – but highly important – 
these special priorities must fit into an overall scheme of 
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cooperation, and the fair terms according to which the group‟s 
cooperation is to be conducted should be explicitly specified (LP, 
p.77).108 
 
 Moreover, the bodies in the consultation hierarchy meet in 
assemblies where representatives can raise objections to government 
policies and obtain replies from members of the government. “Dissent is 
respected in the sense that a reply is due that spells out how the 
government thinks it can both reasonably interpret its policies in line with 
its common good idea of justice and impose duties and obligations on all 
members of society” (LP, p.78). And dissent can lead to reform: “I further 
imagine, as an example of how dissent, when allowed and listened to, can 
instigate change, that in Kazanistan dissent has led to important reforms 
in the rights and role of women, with the judiciary agreeing that existing 
norms could not be squared with society‟s common good idea of justice” 
(LP, p.78). 
 However, Rawls does not hold that every society that respects the 
basic human rights he enumerated is a decent society. 109 Benevolent 
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absolutisms honor human rights but are not well-ordered “because their 
members are denied a meaningful role in making political decisions” (LP, 
p.4). Rawls‟ criteria of decency are necessary conditions for a well-
ordered society; and the criterion that applies to the domestic institutions 
of the society has three parts, one part of which is the requirement that 
human rights be respected. The implication is that respect for human 
rights is not sufficient to make a society a well-ordered one. The other two 
conditions for domestic institutions thus must be met in order that the 
political relationships between the government and the people, as well as 
the political relationships among the people, be moral relationships in 
which mutual duties of justice are recognized and also in order that the 
members of the society be afforded a meaningful role in making political 
decisions (LP, pp, 63, 64).110 
  Thus, the idealized decent hierarchical society, which Rawls 
describes, conforms to the idea of a well-ordered society, although not to 
the idea of a well-ordered liberal society. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
characterizes a well-ordered society as “one designed to advance the 
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good of its members and effectively regulated by public conception of 
justice.”111 He says that such society is one “in which (1) everyone accepts 
and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and (2) 
the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to 
satisfy these principles.”112 In Political Liberalism, Rawls characterizes a 
well-ordered society the same way, however, he adds a third feature to a 
well-ordered society: “citizens have a normally effective sense of justice 
and so they generally comply with society‟s basic institutions which they 
regard as just.”113 
 Although a decent hierarchical society is a well-ordered one, its 
institutions do not satisfy the liberal criterion of reciprocity.  
This criterion requires that, when terms are proposed as the most 
reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must 
think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and 
equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated or under 
pressure caused by an inferior political or social position (LP, p.14).  
 
All liberal conceptions of distributive justice satisfy this criterion, even 
though they may interpret the idea of citizens as free and equal persons, 
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as well as the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation in different 
ways. “Citizen will differ as to which of these conceptions they think the 
most reasonable, but they should be able to agree that all are reasonable, 
even if barely so” (LP, p.14). 
 As a result, a decent non-liberal society‟s conception of domestic 
justice will not be regarded as reasonable by the citizens of a liberal 
society; from a liberal point of view, a decent non-liberal society is an 
unjust, or less than perfectly just, society (LP, p.78, 83). But, a liberal can 
nevertheless recognize a decent non-liberal society as having moral 
character: it is well-ordered in accordance with a legal system founded on 
a “common good” conception of justice that includes protection of human 
rights of all members of the society, and ensuring the rights of political 
participation. Therefore the political relationships in this society are not 
relationships of mere coercion, since both the officials of the government 
and the people governed recognize, and try to fulfill their duties and 
obligations as specified by the conception of justice. 114 
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                   THE RATIONALE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROPER     
 
I believe that the cause of the wealth of a people and the form it take lie 
in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral 
traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social 
institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of 
its members, all supported by their political virtues.  
                                                                                                    John Rawls (LP, p. 108) 
 
In this chapter, my aim is to provide further reasons for 
understanding of why Rawls limits the set of human rights as he does. I 
will explain three arguments in support of the idea of “human rights 
proper” that proposes standards of human rights should be distinguished 
from and be narrower than standards that one approved for a liberal 
democratic society. Those arguments are as follows: first is the principle of 
collective self-determination which is stated in Article 1 of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. The second is a distinction between justice and 
political obligation; the threshold for political obligation is lower than the 
threshold for justice. Finally, the value of toleration, which indicates that a 
decent hierarchical society (non-democratic) can have a moral character 
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that liberal-democratic societies are morally obligated to tolerate.115 Let 
me now briefly explain these arguments. 
 
I. The Principle of Collective Self-determination  
Since the end of the First World War, the principle of self-
determination was suggested as a necessary basis and framework for 
global order. Later, it was incorporated in Article 1 of the United Nations 
Charter which called upon the members “to develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.” Its importance was emphasized by the 1966 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights, whose first articles state the following: “All peoples have 
the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural 
development.” In addition, in 1970, General Assembly Resolution 2625 
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declared that, “Every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance 
with the provision of the Charter.”116 
 
1. The Content of the Right of Collective Self-Determination  
In general terms, self-determination is a matter of individual‟s 
autonomy, regulating its own personal affairs free from external 
intervention. Although individuals almost never attain complete autonomy, 
societies can achieve significant measures of self-government within 
limited areas. So, collective self-determination is a matter of the state, that 
is, of a political community‟s holding and practicing sovereignty over its 
territory.117 Thus, a right of collective self-determination conveys the 
following: each state – an organized political community – has a right to 
exercise rule in its territory through the procedures of governmental 
institutions without external intervention.118 
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Therefore, the right of collective self-determination is a right that a 
given state expects all other states and international agents to recognize 
its internal autonomy and observe the principle of non-intervention toward 
it. But, it is limited by two conditions: first, it can be overridden whenever a 
state engages in grave violation of human rights. Some theorists thus 
confine the right of self-determination to legitimate states, that is, those 
with effective institutional protection of human rights, not those engaged in 
systematic violation of socio-economic and political rights of their citizens, 
and those that do not pursue aggressive aims towards external 
peoples.119 The second condition is derived from a citizen‟s right to reform 
the political institutions under which it exists.120 This condition derives from 
a more general right of self-determination, namely, the self-determination 
of citizens which indicates that the citizens of each state have the right to 
establish, maintain, or change its political institutions. In other words, the 
sovereignty of power belongs to the people and must be exercised 
collectively.121 More precisely, a state‟s right of self-determination derived 
from this basic right that indicates when an external state violates a 
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legitimate regime‟s internal autonomy, therefore, violates its people‟s right 
to establish and preserve itself as a self-governing political system.  
  Thus, recognizing that the collective right of self-determination 
derives from the individual‟s right to self-governance justifies that each 
individual would have a meaningful right to participate in making political 
decisions about their own society. As far as citizens exercise autonomy at 
the political level through their participation in a collective self-governing 
society, therefore, denying citizens‟ right of political participation is in fact 
violating the citizens‟ right to autonomy. 122  As a result, a people has a 
right of collective self-determination simply because individuals have the 
right to be self-governing in the above mentioned minimal sense. 
The question of how the collective self-determination has to be 
carried out is a different issue and it is not specified by international 
covenants. A people‟s right to self-determination requires that the basic 
structure of society is to be derived from the consensus of the whole 
community, not through the preferences and interests of particular internal 
agencies or the external states. But once the agreement has been 
reached, the specific form of political institutions and the public 
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participation should be open to debate. Although, it is usually expected 
that the institutions which are to govern public political life be freely 
determined by popular consent and work by democratic principles, it is not 
clear that the terms of “popular consent” and “free determination” of a 
special political arrangement require democracy.123  
The traditional argument for national self-determination is based on 
the idea that peoples are attached to the way of life of their political 
community; it is therefore important to respect that way of life and the 
internal efforts to improve it. In other words, the right of self-determination 
is based on the idea that cultures or nations are worth preserving, so that 
the advancement of cultures is the significant purpose of the principle.124 
Here, the proper subjects of a right to self-determination are nations or 
peoples, namely, organized societies whose members are united by a 
common language and shared historical and cultural heritage. 
 In LP, Rawls argues that the decent societies are entitled to 
respect, because they are collectively self-governing peoples. All liberal 
democracies claim for themselves a right to self-determination or self-
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governance. Rawls argues that the liberal democratic peoples should 
recognize and respect other peoples – who as moral agents – have the 
same collective right to self-determination. Liberal peoples must respect 
non-liberal yet decent peoples “not on grounds of prudence, but on 
grounds of basic principle.”125 
Thus, the Law of Peoples “does not require decent societies to 
abandon or modify their religious institutions and adopt liberal ones” (LP, 
pp. 63, 121). As Rawls emphasizes that liberal peoples should avoid even 
non-coercive sanctions against those societies. 
[I]t is not reasonable for a liberal people to adopt as part of its own 
foreign policy the granting of subsidies to other peoples as 
incentives to become more liberal... . [S]elf-determination, duly 
constrained by appropriate conditions, is an important good for a 
people... (LP, p 85). 
 
While decent societies enjoy the good of popular attachment to 
their own culture and the way of life, they are capable of self-reform. Their 
capacity for reform can be enhanced if liberals respect them as equal 
members of the Society of Peoples.126 Therefore, Rawls insists that 
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“decent societies should have the opportunity to decide their future for 
themselves” (LP, p. 85). 
 
II. Political Obligation vs. Justice  
The second reason in support of “human rights proper” which I will 
examine is as follows: the requirements of political obligation are narrower 
than the requirements of Justice as Fairness. According to Rawls, a 
condition of a society‟s being well-ordered is that its members are morally 
obligated to obey its laws; but if the society‟s legal and political system 
does not secure their fundamental interests, then they are not so 
obligated. In his discussing of what he calls “the basic idea of society,” 
Rawls says that a society‟s legal system must be a viable one, and that in 
order to be viable, a legal system must “have a certain content,” for 
example the minimum content of natural law as discussed by H.L.A. 
Hart.127 But a society governed by a legal system is not necessarily a 
society in the sense in which Rawls uses this term. He understands the 
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idea as a society “whose members engage, not merely in activities 
coordinated by orders from a central authority, but in activities guided by 
publicly recognized rules and procedures that these cooperating accept 
and regard as properly regulating their conduct.”128  
 In Rawls‟ account of the idea of society, every society has “a 
conception of the right and the good on the basis of which its members 
accept the rules and procedures that guide their activities.” Every such 
conception “includes a conception of justice that can be understood as in 
some way advancing the common good.” And when following its 
conception of justice a “society takes into account the good of all its 
members and of society as a whole.” When this last condition is not met, 
then instead of “a society with a legal system imposing what are correctly 
believed to be genuine obligations,” there is a government that “merely 
coerces its subjects who are unable to resist.”129 Therefore, the political 
and legal system of a society must be guided by a conception of justice 
meeting the condition of taking into account the good of all of its members 
of society as a whole. Thus, given Rawls‟ position that a society with a 
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viable legal system is not necessarily a morally justifiable system of social 
cooperation, he goes beyond Hart‟s view.  
Rawls then makes reference to Philip Soper‟s account of political 
obligation.130 Soper argues that if the regime of a political society is to 
obligate and not merely coerce, its system of law must recognize and 
respect certain rights including not only a minimum right to the security of 
life, liberty and property, and a right to justice understood to support at 
least formal equality, but also a right to discourse, since political obligation 
requires a reciprocal relation between ruler and ruled allowing for mutual 
respect, and this requires a good faith official aim to administer justice. 
Now, recall Rawls‟ necessary condition for moral justification of a 
society‟s political and legal system, namely, the common good idea of 
justice which requires that the fundamental interests of everyone in the 
society must be secured. When interpreted in light of the arguments made 
by Soper, this condition yields the requirement that the idea of justice 
recognize everyone in the society as having at least certain fundamental 
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rights, which Rawls calls human rights. Let me now briefly explain Soper‟s 
arguments for requirements of political obligation.  
 
1. Soper’s Account of Political Obligation   
In his A Theory of Law,131 Philip Soper tends to take a moral 
approach to legal theory by posing the question, “what must law be if it is 
to obligate?” He aims to show that the concept of law implies obligation by 
showing that law obligates and that this fact is one of the phenomena that 
must be explained by an account of the legal systems (TL, pp.11-12). 
Soper says that the essence of his theory of law is captured by a modified 
formulation of Aquinas‟ definition of law as “an ordinance of reason for the 
common good, made by him who has care of the community” (cited in TL, 
p. 55). Soper states that: 
Instead of interpreting the definition to limit “law” to those 
ordinances that in fact serve the common good, one interpret it 
instead to require only that legal directives aim at serving the 
common good, however wide of the mark they may fall. Legal 
systems are essentially characterized by the belief in value, the 
claim in good faith by those who rule that they do so in the interests 
of all. It is this claim of justice, rather than justice in fact, that one 
links conceptually with the idea of law. Thus, the differences 
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between law, morality, and coercion may be represented in terms 
of the variables of force and the belief in value. Law combines the 
organized sanction with the claim to justice by those who wield the 
sanction. Morality makes the same claim but lacks the sanction. 
Coercive systems rely on the sanction alone, unaccompanied by 
any concern for justice (TL, p. 55). 
 
According to Soper, a good faith defense of the system of law as in 
the interest of all is a necessary condition of there being a “reciprocal bond 
between rulers and ruled” (TL, p. 55). And, he argues, this is required if a 
legal system is to be distinguish from a coercive system. He maintains 
that, this feature of a legal system is essential to the idea of law: a “system 
is a legal system not only because basic ground rules are accepted, but 
also because such rules are defended as acceptable” (TL, p. 56). 
 Soper then argues that a necessary condition of the relation 
between rulers and ruled that generates political obligation is an official 
claim of justice, that is, “a good faith effort by those in charge to govern in 
the interests of the entire community, including the dissenting individual.” 
This condition constitutes one of the two conditions which together 
establish political obligation. The other condition relates to the fact that 
“the enterprise of law in general – including this particular legal system, 
defective though it may be, that confronts an individual – is better than no 
law at all” (TL, p.80). 
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 With regard to the latter condition, Soper asserts that if the 
anarchists were right, and all legal systems were undesirable or immoral, 
then there would be no need for political obligation. But the anarchists are 
wrong, because legal systems promote security and stability (TL, p. 81). 
However, a “particular legal system that has so deteriorated as to deny 
even the minimal security that makes the general enterprise valuable will 
not yield” the obligation to obey (TL, p. 83). 
 Soper‟s theory of political obligation thus “depends on the falsity of 
anarchism but does not further depend on the correctness of the 
underlying political or moral principle of a particular society” (TL, p. 83). 
Whether one has a prima facie obligation to obey the law does not depend 
on whether the system is socialist instead of capitalist, or whether the 
system is just or not; it does not depend on the answer to the question of 
which kind of legal system is best, but rather on the answer to the 
question of whether any legal system is defensible at all (TL, p. 83). 
Soper argues that given that the first condition of political obligation 
is met, then whether one has a prima facie obligation to obey the law 
depends on whether those in charge are making a good faith effort to 
govern in the interests of everyone in the community. He holds that if one 
owes respect to those making a good faith effort to govern well, this is 
dependent on their acknowledging one‟s autonomy and one‟s interests:  
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Acknowledgment of the value of law arises out of a rational 
appraisal of self interest in the maintenance of a coercive social 
order. A system that ignores the individual‟s self-interest undercuts 
the basis for the bond between ruler and ruled. . ..the rulers‟ 
respect for my autonomy in evaluating the extent to which law 
reflects my interests requires them at least to consider those 
interests in exercising their authority (TL, p.84). 
 
Thus certain conditions on the contents of the beliefs about justice 
held by the governing officials must be met. According to Soper, the prima 
facie obligation to obey the law depends on the case that the legal system 
reflects the interests of all of the governed. But this significant conclusion 
still requires further specification. What interests must be considered, and 
how? 
 Soper derives a small number of “natural” rights from the two 
conditions presented above, which he regards as necessary and sufficient 
to establish a prima facie obligation to obey the laws of a given legal 
system. These are the right to security, the right to formal equality, and the 
right to discourse. They are, he argues, the only rights that deserve the 
name “natural” from the perspective of legal theory (TL, p.133). 
 Soper agrees with Hart that Legal systems must provide at least 
minimum protection for life, liberty, and property. However, whereas Hart 
argues for this conclusion on the ground that no system that fails to do so 
can remain viable, Soper argues for it on the ground that “without such 
protection no system, even assuming viability, could yield obligation” (TL, 
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p. 130). In so doing, Soper argues, the obligation derives from an honestly 
held idea of justice (TL, p. 121). He maintains that: 
One may protest the assumptions of the theory and attempt to 
prove its inapplicability on the facts while still recognizing and 
respecting the human concern that attaches to the erroneous moral 
outlook. Kant‟s claim that good will deserves moral respect… at 
least has force as a guide to the basis of prima facie obligation and 
respect (TL, pp. 121-122). 
But not just any conduct can be interpreted as an expression of good will: 
There is one exception to this conclusion where the difference in 
manner of treatment becomes so great as to become a difference 
in kind. When the treatment accorded the disadvantaged group is 
so severe as to destroy the minimum security that law must 
provide, obligation is also destroyed. Thus a systematic policy of 
genocide creates no obligation for the victimized group, however 
sincere the official belief in the justice of the policy. So, too, policies 
short of genocide that nevertheless undermine minimal security 
leave the affected individuals or groups without obligation (TL, p. 
122).  
 
  So it is important to note that, claims of justice are inadequate to 
distinguish coercive regimes from legal regimes to which political 
obligation is attached. Since government officials in tyrannical regimes 
typically make insincere claims of justice as a means of social control, 
Soper maintains that good faith claims of justice are a different matter, for 
– as Kant argued – a good will deserves moral respect (TL, pp.121-122). 
The sincere pursuit of justice or the common good must be the dominant 
motive of the actions of governing officials, and if they instead pursue self-
interest or the interests of certain groups, the excluded groups and 
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individuals have no political obligation; or if the claim to justice is a 
deliberate lie, it generates no obligation (TL, pp. 122-123).  
 Sopor points out that in practice it will not be very difficult to 
determine whether claims of justice are so insincere as to destroy the 
basis for obligation:  
Where there is little conventional doubt about the immorality of 
certain practices - torture, slavery, wholesale denial of human rights 
to selected groups - one is not likely to conclude that regimes 
where such practices occur are best characterized as victims of 
their own self-deception. Either the case is one of deception pure 
and simple (political prisoners are tortured but officials knowingly 
deny the fact) or the cases are morally more complicated than one 
supposed (apartheid is sincerely thought to be justified), at most a 
case of moral blindness, not self-deception. But the difficulty of 
uncovering degrees of deception and of distinguishing self-
deception from mere moral blindness provides an unexpected 
possibility for deriving at least one important substantive right, apart 
from security, from the concept of law (TL, p.125). 
 
That right is the right to discourse. It derives from the fact that one 
needs to know whether the government officials sincerely believe in the 
justice of the legal system and of their actions. If they do so, Soper 
argues, they will be prepared to respond to normative challenge with 
normative justification of their coercive orders. Therefore, if the basis for 
mutual respect that underlies law and obligation is to be maintained, 
individuals must have the right to test the sincerity of the official 
justifications by means of discourse; they must have “a right to insist on 
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evidence of the bona fides of belief in the only form in which sincerity can 
be tested: communication, dialogue, exchange, debate” (TL, p.134). 
 The right of discourse that Soper defends, however, is much more 
limited than the freedom of speech and press essential to a liberal 
democracy. As Soper indicates, he is defending a right of discourse as 
part of a theory of what law must be if it is to obligate, and hence as part of 
a theory of the necessary and sufficient conditions of prima facie political 
obligation in general, not as part of a theory of a particular legal order such 
as a liberal democracy. 
The natural right, as opposed to the right derived from liberal 
political theory, is a consequence of the requirement of sincere 
official belief in justice. The concept of sincerity as I have 
developed it has two components: honest belief in fact and respect 
for the possibility of dissent… . Discourse is necessary to ensure 
that belief is honest, particularly in light of the ease with which self- 
deception is possible. But discourse is also necessary because the 
reason that honest belief deserves respect stems from the 
individual‟s recognition of and tolerance for value disagreement; if 
that recognition and tolerance is not mutual, obligation again does 
not result (TL, P.141). 
 
Establishing the requirement of recognition of the right to discourse, 
these arguments do not rely on claims such as that discourse is required 
as a means of enhancing individual personality, or that it is required as a 
means of ensuring individual participation in the governing process. The 
core value of the right of discourse is the justification of the basic political 
structure, and “what is important is the credibility of the official posture that 
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society is open to new values and plausible challenges to accepted 
visions as they emerge.” The right of discourse is not a personal right to 
proselytize or a right to self-expression; it is “a right only to ensure that the 
other side of the normative issue has been fairly considered by officials in 
an attempt to gain control through the rational influence of ideas” (TL, 
pp.141-142). 
 As a result, in Soper‟s view, the rights to security, formal equality, 
and discourse are natural rights, in the following sense: they are “rights 
against the state which can be invaded or ignored only at the cost of 
losing the title of law” (TL, p. 132). Soper distinguishes natural rights from 
other moral rights by connecting the idea of natural rights with the idea of 
law as he understands it.  
In spite of fundamental similarities, there exist several key 
differences between Soper‟s account of natural rights and Rawls‟ 
conception of human rights as follows: First, Rawls adds an international 
dimension to Soper‟s conception of natural rights as he transforms it into 
political conception of human rights. Second, Rawls expects that the 
conception of justice in a decent political society must grant rights of 
political participation in addition to the rights Soper counts as natural 
rights. Third, Rawls aims to develop a political conception of human rights 
that does not pre-suppose the truth of any particular comprehensive 
doctrine and that is consistent with the many different arguments for those 
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basic rights that are offered by different comprehensive doctrines, both 
religious and secular. Finally, whereas Soper is concerned with the 
question of what law is, Rawls is concerned with the question of what are 
the necessary conditions of a morally justifiable system of political and 
social cooperation. Rawls requires the obligation to obey the laws of a 
society be grounded not merely in respect for the government‟s good faith 
effort to serve the common good, but also in the requirements of justice, 
as understood in that society. 
 
III.   The Value of Toleration  
In the remaining of this chapter, I explain the value of toleration; the 
third reason for the “human rights proper.” In LP, Rawls raises the 
question of how liberal-democratic peoples are to tolerate non-liberal and 
non-democratic peoples, and he states that “if all societies were required 
to be liberal, then the idea of political liberalism would fail to express due 
toleration for other acceptable ways (if such there are, as I assume) of 
ordering society” (LP, p. 59).  According to Rawls‟ understanding of 
liberalism, a liberal society should tolerate non-liberal societies that meet 
his criteria of decency.  
Some may say that there is no need for the Law of Peoples to 
develop such an idea of toleration. The reason they might give is 
that citizens in a liberal society should judge other societies by how 
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costly their ideals and institutions express and realize a reasonable 
liberal political conception. Given the fact of pluralism, citizens in a 
liberal society affirm a family of reasonable political conceptions of 
justice and will differ as to which conception is the most reasonable. 
But they agree that nonliberal societies fail to treat persons who 
possess all the powers of reason, intellect, and moral feeling as 
truly free and equal, and therefore, they say, nonliberal societies 
are always properly subject to some form of sanction – political, 
economic, or even military – depending on the case. On this view, 
the guiding principle of liberal foreign policy is gradually to shape all 
not yet liberal societies in a liberal direction, until eventually (in the 
ideal case) all societies are liberal (LP, p. 60). 
So the question apparently remains open:  why are decent non-
liberal peoples entitled to be tolerated and treated with respect by liberal 
peoples? Rawls argues that by recognizing decent non-liberal societies as 
bona fide members of the Society of Peoples, liberal peoples encourage 
such societies to reform themselves and increase the probability that they 
will recognize the advantages of liberal institutions (LP, p. 62). Rawls 
writes, 
Certainly the social world of liberal and decent peoples is not one 
that, by liberal principles, is fully just. Some may feel that permitting 
this injustice and not insisting on liberal principles for all societies 
requires strong reasons. I believe that there are such reasons. Most 
important is maintaining mutual respect among peoples. Lapsing 
into contempt on the one side, and bitterness and resentment on 




According to Rawls, the claim to tolerate the non-liberal societies 
may “require strong reasons” in order to be justified.132 I suggest the 
following considerations in justifying Rawls‟ idea of toleration of decent 
non-liberal peoples.     
 
1. The Reasonable Idea of Toleration                         
  In LP Rawls argues that as the fact of reasonable pluralism sets the 
conditions to be met by a political conception of liberal democracy, in 
which it has a reasonable idea of toleration “[…] that will show the 
reasonableness of toleration by public reason.” Similarly, a political 
conception of the Law of Peoples should express “a reasonable idea of 
toleration derived entirely from the category of the political” (LP, pp. 16-
19). This condition means that it should not be derived from any particular 
comprehensive doctrine, since “the political conception will be 
strengthened if it contains a reasonable idea of toleration within itself, for 
that will show the reasonableness of toleration by public reason” (LP, 
p.16). 
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Rawls uses the term “reasonable” to distinguish between liberal 
and non-liberal societies. A liberal society is a reasonable society, in that 
its basic structure is regulated by a political conception of justice that 
satisfies the criterion of reciprocity, which applies to a scheme of social 
cooperation between free and equal citizens. Rawls asserts that a non-
liberal society is not as reasonable as a liberal society as described above 
(LP, p. 83). However, a non-liberal society can be a well-ordered society, if 
its basic structure regulated by a common good conception of justice, but, 
this conception of justice does not satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.133 
Therefore this society is classified as a non-liberal and not fully reasonable 
society. 
Thus, Rawls acknowledges that a non-liberal society, whether well-
ordered or not, is not a full just society – from a liberal point of view. But, 
there is a significant moral difference between those non-liberal societies 
that are well-ordered, that is, regulated by a conception of justice that 
recognizes and secures basic human rights, and those that are not.134 
Emphasizing the moral significance of these distinctions, Rawls argues 
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that if a non-liberal society is governed in accordance with a conception of 
justice that requires respect for its members‟ basic human rights, and if its 
government seeks to gain and retain membership in a Society of Peoples 
governed by a Law of Peoples, then that non-liberal society is entitled to 
toleration by liberal peoples. To tolerate a decent non-liberal society, he 
explains, here means “not only to refrain from exercising political 
sanctions – military, economic, or diplomatic – to make a people change 
its ways,” but also to recognize it as an “equal participating member in 
good standing of the Society of Peoples” (LP, p. 59).135  
Now we understand what Rawls means by “reasonable idea of 
toleration:” it is a conception of toleration reached by interpreting it in 
terms of the idea of the reasonable. The virtue of reasonableness is the 
foundation for Rawls‟ idea of public reason. Reasonableness requires that 
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tolerance between communities, and not between individuals. On these views of 
toleration, individual liberty is not a principle to be considered. Kymlicka recalls the case 
of the Millet system in the Ottoman Empire. Millet system was composed of communities 
of different religions (Muslims, Jews and Christians), each of them empowered by 
imposing its religious beliefs on the society of its own Millet and, thus, by restricting 
several individual liberties –such as freedom of conscience. Nevertheless, toleration 
between different Millets was strictly respected and, actually, proved to be quite 
functional over the five centuries of the history of the Ottoman Empire.  See Will 
Kymlicka, “Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance” in David Heyd, ed., Toleration: An 
Elusive Virtue (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 83-87. 
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the public reason of a Law of Peoples not be based on any particular 
comprehensive doctrine whether religious or secular.136  
 
2. The virtue of Reasonableness 
 Reflecting on the idea of social cooperation among equals, Rawls 
considers reasonableness as a virtue that people may display when 
engaged in such cooperation. “[T]he moral power that underlies the 
capacity to propose, or to endorse, and then to act from fair terms of 
cooperation for their own sake is an essential social virtue,” everyone can 
exercise and not be displayed only by saints or altruists. People display it 
in ordinary life whenever they engage in social cooperation, while aiming 
to advance their own ends, as long as, they “stand ready to propose fair 
terms that others may reasonably be expected to accept, so that all may 
benefit and improve on what every one can do on their own” (Liberalism, 
p. 54). 
  This idea resonates the idea of reciprocity. Persons engaging in 
social cooperation are reasonable only if they are willing to endorse and 
                                               
 
136
 Rawls says, political liberalism “moves within the category of the political and leaves 
philosophy as it is.” Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 375. 
108 
 
act on fair terms; they regard terms as fair only if they meet the criterion of 
reciprocity. This criterion requires that those proposing the terms 
“reasonably think” that those offered them might “reasonably accept 
them,” i.e., that they could accept them without being “dominated or 
manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social 
position,” but instead on a free and equal standing (Liberalism, pp. xliv, 
xlvi, and li.). Persons engaging in social cooperation among equals ought 
to be reasonable. The characteristics of reasonable person in Rawls‟ view 
can be summarized as follows: (1) (a) possesses the two moral powers –
the capacities for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good, (b) 
possesses the intellectual powers of judgment, thought, and inference, (c) 
holds a conception of the good in the light of a comprehensive doctrine, 
(d) is able to be fully cooperating members of society over a complete life; 
(2) is able to propose and follow a conception of justice, knowing that the 
other citizens will do so; (3) recognizes the burdens of judgment; (4) has a 
reasonable moral psychology; and (5) recognizes the five essential 
elements of a conception of objectivity.137    
 Rawls discusses two basic aspects of the value of reasonableness: 
two kinds of motivation that a reasonable person would have. First, a 
                                               
 
137
 See Leif Wenar, “Political Liberalism: an Internal Critique,” Ethics, Vol. 106, no. 1 
(1995), p. 37. 
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reasonable person is “willing to propose fair terms of cooperation;” and 
second, a reasonable person is “willing to recognize the burdens of 
judgment and to accept their consequences” (Liberalism, p. 54).  
 
3. The Burdens of Judgment 
 By “the burdens of judgment” Rawls refers to “the sources, or 
causes, of disagreement between reasonable persons” (Liberalism, p. 
401).These sources or causes of disagreement are “the many hazards 
involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of 
reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life.” 
As reasonable and rational we have to make different kinds of 
judgments. As rational we have to balance our various ends and 
estimate their appropriate place in our way of life; and doing this 
confronts us with great difficulties in making correct judgments of 
rationality. On the other hand, as reasonable we must assess the 
strength of people‟s claims, not only against our claims, but against 
one another, or on our common practices and institutions, all this 
giving rise to difficulties in our making sound reasonable judgments. 
In addition, there is the reasonable as it applies to our beliefs and 
schemes of thought, or the reasonable as appraising our use of our 
theoretical (and not our moral and practical) powers, and here too 
we met the corresponding kinds of difficulties. We need to keep in 
mind these three kinds of judgments with their characteristic 
burdens (Liberalism, p. 56). 
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This is not only unreasonable but also unrealistic to suppose that 
“all our differences are rooted solely in ignorance and perversity, or else in 
the rivalries for power, status, or economic gain.”138 Because “many of our 
most important judgments are made under conditions where it is not to be 
expected that conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after 
free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion.” And this holds not 
only regarding moral judgments but regarding all kinds of important or 
difficult judgments (Liberalism, p. 58). 
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 Instead, Rawls says “the more obvious sources” of disagreement (the burdens of 
judgment) are as follows: 
“a. The evidence -empirical and scientific - bearing on the case is conflicting and 
complex, and thus hard to asses and evaluate. 
b. Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are relevant, we may 
disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different judgment. 
c. To some extent all our concepts, and not only moral and political concepts, vague and 
subject to hard cases;.... 
d. To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and weigh 
moral and political values is shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up to 
now; and our total experiences must always differ. … 
e. Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force on both 
sides of an issue and it is difficult to make an overall assessment. 
f. [A]ny system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some 
selection must be made from the full range of moral and political values that might be 
realized. …” (Liberalism, pp. 56-57). 
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4. Reasonable Comprehensive Doctrines 
 But, what determines whether a comprehensive doctrine should be 
considered as reasonable according to the criteria appropriate to the Law 
of Peoples? Recall the two basic aspects of the virtue of reasonableness: 
(1) a reasonable person is “willing to propose and honor fair terms of 
cooperation;” (2) a reasonable person is “willing to recognize the burdens 
of judgment and to accept their consequences” as regards freedom of 
thought, liberty of conscience and toleration (Liberalism, p. 48, fn # 1). 
Here, the terms of cooperation are the principles of the Law of Peoples. A 
society is reasonable if it is both willing to propose and honor fair 
principles, as well as willing to recognize the burdens of judgment and to 
accept their consequences as regards toleration. 
 The consequence of the free exercise of reason is the development 
of a variety of doctrines, secular and religious. In a liberal democratic 
society, reasonable people who affirm comprehensive doctrines will affirm 
reasonable ones. Rawls defines reasonable doctrines as having three 
main features:  
One is that a reasonable doctrine is an exercise of theoretical 
reason: it covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral 
aspects of human life in a more or less consistent and coherent 
manner. It organizes and characterizes recognized values so that 
they are compatible with one another and express an intelligible 
view of the world. Each doctrine will do this in ways that distinguish 
it from other doctrines, for example, by giving certain values a 
particular primacy and weight. In singling out which values to count 
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as especially significant and how to balance them when they 
conflict, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is also an exercise of 
practical reason. Both theoretical and practical reason... are used 
together in its formulation. Finally, a third feature is that while a 
reasonable comprehensive view is not necessarily fixed and 
unchanging, it normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of 
thought and doctrine. Although stable over time,…, it tends to 
evolve slowly in the light of what, from its point of view, it sees as 
good and sufficient reasons” (Liberalism, p. 59).  
 
The point that reasonable doctrines tend to evolve slowly is 
relevant to the case of societies like Kazanistan: by hypothesis, such a 
society has already become more moderate and liberal; it may continue to 
develop in the same direction. Being themselves reasonable, they will 
acknowledge that reasonable people can affirm different comprehensive 
doctrines, and also that all reasonable people are subject to the burdens 
of judgment. And they will think it unreasonable to use political power to 
repress comprehensive views that are not unreasonable. Here, “being 
reasonable” is:  
part of a political ideal of democratic citizenship that includes the 
idea of public reason. The content of this ideal includes what free 
and equal citizens as reasonable can require of each other with 
respect to their reasonable comprehensive views. In this case they 
cannot require anything contrary to what the parties as their 
representatives in the original position could grant. So, for example, 
they could not grant that everyone must affirm a particular 
comprehensive view (Liberalism, p. 62). 
In a Society of Peoples, however, the virtue of reasonability is not 
part of a political ideal of democratic citizenship; it is instead part of a 
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political ideal of social cooperation among free and equal peoples. The 
content of this ideal includes what reasonable free and equal peoples can 
require of each other with respect to their reasonable comprehensive 
views.  
 In LP Rawls aims to develop a conception of right and justice 
applicable to relations among peoples, specifying their mutual duties and 
the limits of state sovereignty, that would be a political conception on 
which there can be an “overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines.” 
This aim leads him to develop a Law of Peoples that avoids “excluding 
doctrines as unreasonable without strong grounds based on clear 
respects of the reasonable itself” (Liberalism, p. 59). Here the burdens of 
judgment are relevant: Recognizing them “limits the scope of what 
reasonable persons think can be justified to others, and... this leads to a 
form of toleration and supports the idea of public reason” (Liberalism, p. 
59). 
The implication of Rawls‟ view is that the societies less just than 
Kazanistan (which secures the basic human rights for all of its members) 
are not entitled to membership (or to good standing) in the Society of 
Peoples. They do not have the rights of peoples, including full rights of 
self- determination and non-intervention, and other peoples do not have 
the duties to tolerate them and cooperate with such unjust societies. 
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Rawls argues that a society such as Kazanistan could exist.139 He 
shows that if there can be decent non-democratic societies, that have 
such a moral character, liberal societies are obligated to tolerate them (LP, 
p.75, note 16). Then, the principles guiding liberal societies in their 
conduct toward other societies should be such that decent non-democratic 
societies can endorse those principles. And if liberal societies are to 
require other societies to respect human rights, then this requirement and 
its associated justification of human rights, should be such that decent 
non-democratic societies can endorse them (LP, p. 68). He does so 
because he thinks it is not morally permissible for liberal societies to 
compel all non-democratic societies to become liberal democracies; the 
mere fact that a society‟s political system is not democratic is not 
obviously sufficient justification for the use of coercive force against it to 
compel domestic institutional change. Thus Rawls argues that a 
conception of justice and human rights applicable to global order must be 
endorsable by all peoples, that is, by all decent societies, whether liberal 
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 Rawls points out that “The Law of Peoples does not presuppose the existence of 
actual decent hierarchical peoples any more than it presupposes the existence of actual 
reasonably just constitutional democratic peoples. If we set the standard very high, 
neither exists" (LP, p. 75). However, some commentators of Rawls‟ the Law of Peoples 
have offered the actual examples of decent hierarchical society. For instance, David 
Reidy in his “Rawls on International Justice: A Defense,” Political Theory, Vol. 32, no. 3 
(2004), pp. 291–319, states that, in some respect, Oman could be a decent society, and 
Chris Brown in his “John Rawls, „The Law of Peoples‟ and International Political Theory,” 
Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 14, no.1 (2000), pp. 125–32, argues that Rawls‟ 
concept of decent hierarchical peoples could be extended to the societies such as Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.  
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or non-liberal. It must meet the criterion of reciprocity. This criterion 
requires that a conception of human rights depend on no particular 
comprehensive ethical or religious doctrine.  
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CHAPTER 4    
 
                        HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC DOCTRINE 
  
[Islam] demands loyalty to God, not to thrones.... The ultimate spiritual 
basis of all life, as conceived by Islam is eternal and reveals itself in 
variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality 
must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change.       
                                                                               





The central idea of Rawls‟ account is that a conception of human 
rights should be freestanding, that is, a conception of human rights 
suitable for a pluralistic world must be independent of any incompatible 
philosophical, ethical or religious doctrines.141 This conception can serve 
as the object of an overlapping consensus among different ethical and 
religious traditions; each may offer a different line of argument.142 In this 
regard, Rawls‟ view recalls the observation in the Universal Declaration of 
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 Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, ed., M. Saeed 
Sheikh (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 2
nd
 edition, 1989), p. 116. 
141
 See Rawls, LP, p. 68. 
142
 Charles Taylor argues for the use of an idea of overlapping consensus in the context 
of Buddhism. See Charles Taylor, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human 
Rights” in Joanne Bauer & Daniel Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 124-145. 
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Human Rights (UDHR) that human rights are “a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations.” Jacques Maritain143 – who 
participated in discussions leading to the UDHR – says that the point of 
formulating an idea of human rights, to be shared by adherents of different 
traditions, was to make agreement “not on the basic of common 
speculative ideas, but on common practical ideas, not on the affirmation of 
one and the same conception of the world, of [humanity] and knowledge, 
but upon the affirmation of a single body of beliefs for guidance in 
action.”144 Given this practical role of the idea of human rights and in a 
context of diversity, we need to avoid justification for human rights by 
referring to a “particular comprehensive religious doctrine or philosophical 
doctrine of human nature.” Rawls‟ account does not rely on these 
arguments that “human beings are moral persons and have equal worth in 
the eyes of God; or that they have certain moral and intellectual powers 
that entitle them to these rights” (LP, p. 68). To argue in these ways, that 
is, “to tie human rights exclusively to a single, ultimate foundation would 
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 Jacques Maritain (1882–1973), French philosopher and political thinker was a leading 
Christian figure in 20th century attempts to reconcile Catholic social thought with 
democracy and human rights. 
144
 Jacques Maritain, “Introduction,” in Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations. A 
symposium edited by UNESCO (Paris: UNESCO, 1948). 
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be to undermine the possibility of justifying them to those who hold a 
different comprehensive doctrine.”145  
 Therefore, a freestanding conception of human rights aims to 
create an agreement on the recognition of the fact of pluralism of ethical 
and religious traditions. But the agreement will not stand with awareness 
of the contents of these traditions. I do not argue that we can find a 
political conception of human rights within existing comprehensive 
doctrines. Instead, as Rawls emphasizes, there are ways to revise or 
elaborate an ethical and religious doctrine that is “non-liberal in its 
conception of the person and political society, but that is also consistent 
with a reasonable conception of standards to which political societies can 
reasonably be held.”146  
  Thus, in order to avoid presenting a political conception of justice 
(and human rights) in the wrong way, “we do not look to the 
comprehensive doctrines that in fact exist and then draw up a political 
conception that strikes some kind of balance of forces between them.” 
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 Jon Mandle, Global Justice (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 51. Rawls says that “still, the 
Law of Peoples does not deny these doctrines” (LP, p. 68). 
146
 Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?” p. 
194. Cohen argues that attempting to articulate a conception of human right in an ethical 
tradition without fresh elaboration of that tradition by its proponents will lead to either 
substantive minimalism or cultural relativism.   
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Instead, we should distinguish “between the initial allegiance to, or 
appreciation of, the political conception and the later adjustment or 
revision of comprehensive doctrines to which that allegiance or 
appreciation leads when inconsistencies arise.”147 In this way, the 
endeavor of showing that the idea of human rights can be endorsed by 
different ethical and religious traditions may require revision or 
reconstruction of those traditions by their adherents.148 It is worth noting 
that, reconstruction or revision of a tradition does not simply mean to 
make the tradition in question compatible “with the demands of the world, 
but to provide that tradition with its most compelling statement.”149 To 
illustrate the point about reconstruction or revision of a tradition regarding 
a conception of human rights, I want to examine the most reasonable 
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 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, pp. 188, 193. Rawls maintains that 
“These adjustment or revisions we may suppose to take place slowly over time as the 
political conception shapes comprehensive views to cohere with it” Ibid, p.193.  
148
 The necessity of revision or elaboration of comprehensive doctrines by their 
proponents in order to achieve an overlapping consensus on the conception of justice as 
fairness as well as the conception of human rights has been addressed and emphasized 
by Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 37, 188-89, and Joshua Cohen, 
“Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?” pp. 201,207. Muslim 
intellectuals also have argued that Islamic revivalism or reformism cannot succeed 
without a fundamental reconstruction, rethinking or reformation of Islamic doctrine. See 
for example, Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam; 
Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon answers 
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994); Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic 
Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis (Amsterdam University Press, 2006). See also 
Daniel W. Brown, Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).      
149
 Cohen, “Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?” p. 201. See 
also Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 62. 
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position in the current Islamic reformation what has been called “Islamic 
intellectualism.”  
I am not interested here in which rights are human rights by 
deriving them from Islamic doctrine; instead, I am concerned with which 
views emerging from the Islamic tradition are reasonable responses to the 
requirements of affirmation of a conception of human rights. Put 
differently, my aim is “to explore the possibilities for achieving a normative 
reconciliation”150 between the Islamic fundamentals and human rights. I 
concentrate on the theoretical concepts, elaborated by Muslim 
intellectuals which are justifiable and affirmed within the framework of the 
Islamic tradition. What I hope to achieve in this chapter is to identify and to 
analyze the potentialities within Islamic doctrine for endorsing a 
freestanding conception of human rights. 
  
I. The Epistemological Basis of Islamic Intellectualism  
 
The central idea of contemporary Islamic intellectualism can be 
formulated as follows: “the connection between the revealed text and 
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 I have borrowed the phrase from Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Human Rights 
Commitment in Modern Islam,” p. 303. 
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modern society does not turn upon a literalist hermeneutic, but rather 
upon an interpretation of the spirit and broad intention behind the specific 
language of the text.”151 The most reasonable account of the religious 
epistemology among Muslim intellectuals, elaborates this central idea as 
follows: religion is God-sent and therefore is eternal, pure and absolute, 
but, its understanding is bounded by the limited human cognitive 
faculties.152 Thus, one cannot attribute sacredness and completeness to 
any interpretation of the religion, because sacredness and absoluteness 
reside in religion itself. No understanding of religion is sacred and eternal 
forever. In fact, every proper understanding of religion depends on the 
pursuit of a methodical, systematic, and justifiable inquiry.153 This process 
of investigation, which is directed at the true meaning of religious texts, 
always takes place within the broader context of human inquiry regarding 
the world in general.  
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 Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p. 231. For a general survey of the Muslim intellectuals see Charles 
Kurzman, Liberal Islam: A Source Book (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); see 
also, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, no. 2 (2003). This issue of the journal is dedicated to 
the ideas of Muslim intellectuals. 
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 See also Hossein Kamali, “The Theory of Expansion and Contraction of Religion”, 
http://www.seraj.org/kamali.htm. 
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 Abdolkarim Soroush, Qabz va Bast-e Tiorik-e Shari’at (The Theory of Contraction and 
Expansion Religious Knowledge), (Tehran: Serat, 1990), p. 249. The translation of the 
passages are mine. 
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This hermeneutical-epistemological attitude, assumes that no text 
stands alone; every text is to be considered with a context: “It is theory-
laden, its interpretation is in flux, and presuppositions are here as actively 
at work as elsewhere in the field of understanding. Religious texts are no 
exception.”154 Therefore, any interpretation is subject to expansion and 
contraction according to prior assumptions (these assumptions can be of a 
very different nature, ranging from philosophical, historical, and theological 
to more specific assumptions of linguistics and sociology).155 Since 
presuppositions are time-bound, they do change and evolve religious 
knowledge constantly. In other words, religious knowledge, in an ongoing 
dialogue with the other branches of human knowledge, is constantly 
changing and reconstructing over time. 
 Another major assumption is that the sacred text is silent and that 
only through those presuppositions and assumptions that one can hear 
the voice of revelation. In addition, since the interpretation of “the text is 
social by nature and depends on the community of experts, it entails right 
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and wrong, certain and dubious ideas. A wrong interpretation is as 
important as a right one, from the evolutionary point of view.”156 
  The preceding arguments as Soroush points out can be briefly 
outlined as follows: 
1. The sacred scripture is silent. 
2. Religious knowledge is relative that is relative to the 
presuppositions. 
3. Religious knowledge is age-bound, because presuppositions, 
themselves, are time-bound. 
4. Revealed religion itself may be true and free of contradictions but 
religious knowledge is not necessarily so. 
5. Religion may be perfect or comprehensive but not so for the 
religious knowledge. 
6. Religion is divine; but the interpretation of religion is a human 
endeavor. 157  
 
This approach does not imply that man-made science and 
knowledge are to replace religion; instead it indicates that the body of 
knowledge accumulated by the human reason should be utilized for 
refining and developing man‟s understanding of religion. The religious 
scholars always consult the sacred text and the tradition. But, it is the task 
of religious scholars to be constantly aware of the underlying structure and 
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125 
 
theoretical account that they take for granted as they try to make sense of 
the sacred text. And they should attempt to extend their framework and 
keep it rationally reliable and feasible.158    
This approach to religious epistemology calls for contemporary 
Muslim scholars to revise their understanding of Islam in light of the many 
fundamental intellectual challenges being posed today to any living 
religion. This approach attempts to specify a research program for Islamic 
revivalism. The type of revivalism and reformism that it promotes is mainly 
concerned with extra-religious values, such as reason, justice and morality 
and the foundations required for a time-bound understanding of the divine 
text. 
 
II. Muslim Intellectuals’ Responses to the Challenge of Human 
Rights 
 
As to the issue of human rights, Muslim intellectuals presented a 
variety of conceptual responses. Some of them methodologically locates 
the primary universal values, such as religious pluralism, toleration, and 
religious freedom and employ these values as a way in which a 






conception of human rights can be included in a formulation of Islamic 
doctrine.159 On the other hand, many intellectuals make the argument that 
“God‟s original intent was consistent with a scheme of greater rights for 
human beings, but that the socio-historical experience was unable to 
achieve a fulfillment of such intent.”160 Still, the others argue that justice as 
the core value in Islamic doctrine, which takes the ethics of mercy 
seriously, requires respect for human diversity and recognition of human 
rights that are due to human beings.161 In the rest of this chapter, I briefly 
examine the most important representatives of these enterprises and 
show how the Islamic doctrine might be formulated in a way that can gain 
the support of an overlapping consensus on a freestanding conception of 
human rights.  
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 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Human Rights Commitment in Modern Islam” in J. Runzo, 
N. Martin, and A. Sharma, eds., Human Rights and Responsibilities in the World Religion 
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), pp. 301-364. For Muslim intellectuals that are associated with 
this form of reasoning see Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic 
Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Farid Esack, Qur’an, Liberalism, and 
Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworld, 1997); Abdulhi A. An-Na‟im, Toward an Islamic 
Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University press, 1996); Abdullahi A. An-Na‟im, Human Rights, Religion and the 
Contingency of Universalist Projects (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2001); 
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, The Dignity of Man: An Islamic Perspective (Cambridge: 
Islamic Texts Society, 2002); Ahmad Moussali, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, 
Pluralism, and Human Rights (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001).  
161
 See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islam and Challenge of Democracy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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1. Soroush and the Value of Toleration and Pluralism  
 Muslim intellectuals acknowledge that a conception of human 
rights may have originated as a non-religious idea, but its significance and 
generality can win support by different religious doctrines. For example, 
Abdolkarim Soroush162 argues that the religious knowledge, “as a variety 
of human knowledge,” contributes positively to our understanding of the 
conception of human rights. According to Soroush, the problems related to 
global ethics, such as world peace and human rights, require the 
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 Abdolkarnn Soroush (1945-present) was born into a lower middle-class family in 
Tehran. He attended the highly reputed Alavi high school - an independent school - in 
which its founders adopted an educational philosophy that embraced both the modern 
sciences and religious doctrine. Following high school, Soroush entered the University of 
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Columbia, and the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin. In 2005 Time named him one of the 
world‟s 100 most influential people. For a good account of Soroush‟s intellectual 
influences and development, see, “Intellectual Autobiography: An Interview,” in Reason, 
Freedom, and Democracy in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 3-25. 
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contribution of diverse ethical and religious traditions: “We are all travelers 
on a ship, if one person pokes a hole in it, all of us will drown.”163 
 Soroush argues that a plurality of voices, both secular and 
religious, is required for justice to be fulfilled. Furthermore, in order to 
arrive at the truth, various perspectives are needed to be considered. 
However, he considers the “vast scope of insoluble religious differences 
compounded by the self-assurance of everyone involved.”164 Adherents of 
different religious traditions often claim that theirs is the only path to the 
truth and salvation, and that therefore they ought not to tolerate people‟s 
beliefs in other traditions. They may attempt to convert others or to call 
them infidels and wage war against them. But, on Soroush‟s view the facts 
point to a contrary conclusion; he argues that the existence of diverse 
ethical and religious traditions, gives “rise to the suspicion that God may 
favor this pluralism.”165 Each of these ethical and religious traditions may 
offer an “aspect of the truth,” the whole of which can only be discovered by 
recognizing these insights into “guidance and salvation.”166 Along with 
asserting the divine cause of diverse religions, and also given the 
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implications of the Qur‟anic verse that there is “no compulsion in religion 
(2:256),” then we have reasons to embrace religious pluralism as a will of 
God.  
In so doing, Soroush recognizes the necessity of religious toleration 
– as an outcome of religious pluralism – in societies claiming to support 
human rights. Religious toleration, he argues, derives not from “liberal 
mindedness, faithlessness, or scepticism”, rather, it stems from a 
“profound philosophical anthropology” and an “intimate knowledge of the 
intricacies of the human soul.”167 Therefore, a religious individual who 
treats other people with intolerance, due to their beliefs, actually, commits 
an intellectual mistake in failing to distinguish between people and beliefs. 
One may disagree with a belief and find it to be false, yet at the same time 
find the holder of that belief “blameless, respectable, and even 
commendable.”168 Toleration, Soroush says, “concerns believers not 
beliefs.”169 
Soroush thinks that religious pluralism and religious toleration 
constitute an argument for democracy. Given his understanding of 
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democracy as a method of restraining political power, he says that the 
“only thing that is required of a democracy is tolerance of different points 
of view and their advocates.”170 The existence of different points of view, 
through the channels of political parties and free press, serves to verify 
excesses of political power.171 The freedom of expression of different 
religious perspectives is particularly important in religious governments. 
“Belief is a hundred times more diverse and colorful than disbelief. If the 
pluralism of secularism makes it suitable for democracy, the faithful 
community is a thousand times more suitable for it.”172 The existence of 
diverse ethical and religious doctrines and various interpretations of 
religion promote “understanding of the principles of right and justice.”173  
Thus, in societies that are regulated by religious law, allowing for a 
variety of religious knowledge enables those societies to create “free, just 
and reasonable” religious jurisprudence.  As a matter of fact, 
contemporary Muslim societies are reducing Islam to religious 
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jurisprudence (fiqh). But Islamic history and culture have clearly shown 
that fiqh is not the same as the religion of Islam. Soroush argues that by 
recognition and toleration of different reasonable understandings of Islam, 
this wrong mixture of religion and religious jurisprudence would eventually 
be corrected. He maintains that “free faith and dynamic religious 
understanding are inseparable from free, just, and reasonable 
jurisprudence.”174 
In accordance with his understanding of the divine origin of faith, 
Soroush argues that religious jurisprudence can only be just when it 
recognizes the religious significance of freedom of thought. To enforce 
laws in order to display the religiosity or apostasy of citizens, would intrude 
into God‟s dominion. One may ask “What authenticity and ground would 
religious law have if it disregarded the freedom of faith and the humanity 
of understanding, refused to base its precepts upon these, and neglected 
to harmonize its regulations with them?”175 This will demonstrate the 
hypocrisy of religious laws – that claim they are inspired by God – if they 
actually oppose the dynamics of religious experience and belief. 
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Thus, religious freedom specifies a basic feature of a religious 
society: 
Freedom is essential. Even those who adopt the path of religion 
and submission are valued because they have chosen this path 
freely. True submission is predicated upon the principle of freedom; 
indeed, they are the one and the same. Is there any merit in an 
imposed religion or forced prayers? Have we forgotten the Qur‟anic 
verse: „Let there be no compulsion in faith?‟176  
Soroush maintains that God intends for humans to be free. Freedom 
enables individuals to be genuine religious believers. Persons who are 
coerced into a belief will go through the motions of the faithful, but without 
any religious content. “Religion is, by definition, incompatible with 
coercion. Freedom has two virtues: it endows life and the choices we 
make in it with meaning.”177 The genuine religious life is entirely 
compatible with a truly democratic government. 
According to Soroush, the governments which restrict religious 
freedom out of fear that apostasy will result, are limiting the discovery of 
truth. Those “who shun freedom as the enemy of truth and as a possible 
breeding ground for wrong ideas do not realize that freedom is itself a 
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truth (haq).”178 The confidence in the capacity of freedom to arrive at the 
truth is evidence of trust in God. Religious rulers who attempt to restrict 
human freedom exhibit a lack of trust in God.179 Although, freedom “might 
upset personal convictions ... it cannot possibly offend the truth except for 
those who presume to personify the absolute truth.”180 
Soroush also criticizes those who argue for the elimination or 
limitation of freedom in an attempt to prevent challenging ideas. Freedom 
encourages peoples to challenge the existing practice, and the 
assumptions of authoritarian institutions. Therefore, only those who 
“consider themselves to be directly inspired by God, who profess to 
possess the absolute truth, and who find their reason above benefiting 
from the assistance and consultation of others, will refuse the gifts of 
freedom.”181  
Furthermore, Soroush argues that a society that secures religious 
freedom or liberty of conscience, in fact, distinguishes “religion as an 
                                               
 
178
 Ibid., p. 90. 
179
 Ibid., p. 100. 
180
 Ibid., p. 91. 
181
 Ibid., p. 92. 
134 
 
individual experience from religion as a collective institution.”182 Although 
the notions of religion as a personal experience and as a social institution 
may overlap, in order to respect religious freedom, the two must remain 
distinct.  
In sum, Soroush‟s idea of human rights is based on his religious 
epistemology (the theory of contradiction and expansion of religious 
knowledge) which I discussed earlier. The distinction between religion and 
religious knowledge and mutual contribution of extra-religious knowledge 
and intra-religious knowledge in interpretation of Shari‟a and humanization 
of religion are the key to reformulation of Islamic doctrine. Soroush 
considers the values such as pluralism, religious freedom and toleration 
as central to developing a conception of human rights in the Muslim world. 
He takes the normative position that a religious society is a moral society 
and not necessarily a society where strict religious jurisprudence binds its 
modus operandi. His conviction, in which the truth might be discovered 
through open discussion and consideration of diverse moral perspectives, 
provides a sound basis for cross-cultural dialogues about the possibility of 
a global ethics of human rights.  
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2.  An-Naim and the Hermeneutical Shift in the Public Law of 
Shari’a 
Many Muslim intellectuals argue that God‟s intent is consistent with 
human rights, but the social and historical experiences were disputed and 
even blocked the materialization of such intent. Given this argument, 
Abdullahi An-Na‟im183 claims that the classical understanding of Qur‟anic 
texts prevents the Islamic law from reconciling to modernity and hampers 
attempts for reform within the traditional methodology. He explains that the 
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traditional methodology does allow a considerable degree of interpretation 
through ijtihad (i.e., independent juristic reasoning). Further, the classical 
principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) cannot exceed the limits of its own 
hermeneutics.184 Therefore, both law and methodology must be 
reformulated since much of the law is no longer applicable:  
Given the fundamental conception and detailed rules of Shari‟a, it is 
clear that the objectionable aspects cannot possibly be altered 
through the exercise of ijtihad as defined in historical Shari‟a for the 
simple reason that Shari‟a does not permit ijtihad in these matters 
because they are governed by clear and definite texts of the Qur‟an 
and Sunna.185  
In contrast with this, An-Na‟im argues that “contemporary Muslims have 
the competence to reformulate usul al-fiqh [principles of jurisprudence] 
and exercise ijtihad even in matters governed by clear and definite texts of 
the Qur‟an and the Sunna as long as the outcome of such ijtihad is 
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consistent with the essential message of Islam.”186 But, how this 
hermeneutical shift can reconstruct the meaning of morality and law in the 
Qur‟anic texts? 
An-Na‟im argues that it is possible to obviate the clear and explicit 
texts that are not subject to reinterpretation through the traditional 
conception of ijtihad particularly those that are incompatible with human 
rights and justice. The solution he offers is that Islamic law must be 
derived from the Meccan text of the Qur‟an and not the Medinan one. An-
Na‟im explains this approach as follows: 
[…] in this book, The Second Message of Islam …, Ustadh 
Mahmoud187 proposed to shift certain aspects of Islamic law from 
their foundation in one class of texts of the Qur‟an and Sunnah and 
place them on a different class of texts of the Qur‟an and Sunnah. 
The limitations of reform noted above are removed by reviving the 
earlier texts, which were never made legally binding in the past, 
and making them the basis of modem Islamic law. Explicit and 
definite texts of the Qur‟an and Sunnah that were the basis of 
discrimination against women and non-Muslims under historical 
Shari‟a are set aside as having served their transitional purpose. 
Other texts of the Qur‟an and Sunnah are made legally binding in 
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order to achieve full equality for all human beings, regardless of sex 
or religion.188  
 
Elaborating on his mentor Ustadh Mahmoud Taha‟s thought, An-
Na‟im suggests that the Qur‟an should be understood as containing two 
messages responding to two stages during the twenty-three years of 
revelation and that these messages should be distinguished by the 
particular texts of Mecca and Medina.189 The basic assumption of An-
Na‟im‟s methodology for reform is that the Meccan text contains the 
eternal and fundamental message of Islam. The substance of the 
message emphasizes the original principles, values, and moral character 
of Islam and conveys “the stage of the truth (al-haqiqah) or knowledge.”190 
It emphasizes the inherent dignity of all human beings and the equality of 
                                               
 
188
 An-Na‟im, “Introduction” in Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, The Second Message of Islam, 
trans. Abdullahi An-NI‟im (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996), p. 23.  
189
 This distinction between the Meccan and Medinan texts is not a new idea and was 
developed by the Malikite jurist Abu Ishaq al-Sbatibi (d.1388) in the fourteenth century. It 
is interesting to note that while An-Na‟im and Sbatibi share this impression of the Qur‟an, 
they depart from each other regarding the meaning and elaboration of this understanding. 
While Sbatibi, through an inductive survey of the Qur‟an, argues that abrogation was not 
applied to the Meccan universals but only to Medinan rulings, An-Na‟im regards the 
universals themselves as abrogated by the clear and explicit texts of Medina. Moreover, 
while Sbatibi calls for a holistic approach to the Qur‟an, by which every part of the later 
Medinan text must be viewed and explained in terms of the earlier Meccan text, An-Na‟im 
divides the two revelations into separate entities that are relatively independent of each 
other. See Wael B Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni 
Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chap. five. 
190
 See Taha, The Second Message of Islam, p. 46. 
139 
 
all persons regardless of gender, race or religious belief as well as the 
freedom of choice in matters of faith.191 The verses address the whole of 
humanity through expressions such as “O, mankind” and “O, children of 
Adam,” that speak to all people at all times.192 This message transcends 
all temporal classifications and limitations and provides an inclusive 
meaning of Islam. 
The content of this message, however, shifted from the stage of 
truth to that of dogma (al-aqidah) with the migration of the Prophet to 
Medina. An-Na‟im associates the change of the message with the inability 
of the emerging Muslim community to implement the message of the 
Meccan period, because, it was entirely inappropriate for seventh century 
Arabian society. He states “When that superior level of the message was 
violently and irrationally rejected and it was practically demonstrated that 
society at large was not yet ready for its implementation, the more realistic 
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message of the Medina stage was provided and implemented.”193 The 
message of the Meccan period was rejected, because it did not offer 
practical support for the survival and unity of a community existing in a 
hostile environment. The Medinan text was revealed specifically to the 
early Muslim community in order to guide and assist them in establishing 
and spreading the religion in a violent social situation. The audience of the 
revelation is no longer universal but speaks to a particular nation of 
adherents to the new faith, indicated by phrases such as “O, believers” or 
“O, you who have attained the faith” (2:178) instead of “O, mankind.” 
Because the audience of the revelation in Medina is specific, the 
content is also specific, related to actual circumstances and events of the 
time, and offering practical solutions to social realities. This is observed in 
the relationship between the Muslims and non-Muslims, by which the 
strength of the faith and its political survival could not be secured by 
following the principles established in Mecca (non-coercion, peaceful co-
existence) but called for explicit permission of forceful action, which was 
justified by the historical context of violent inter-communal relations. 
However, the use of force was allowed in a progressive manner, 
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demonstrating a gradual change in the content of the message.194 The 
Qur‟an first permitted force in self-defense and retaliation for injustices 
executed by unbelievers,195 but, An-Na‟im emphasizes that “the 
overwhelming impact of the Qur‟an of Medina has been to sanction, if not 
positively command, the use of varying degrees of coercion on non-
Muslims to induce them to convert to Islam.”196 These verses are a 
Medinan phenomenon intended to confront the immediate issues of that 
society. 
Thus, the Medinan text contains verses that addressed and 
regulated the affairs of the Muslim community that were appropriate for 
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that historical time. The Islamic society that was developing could not 
completely release itself from pre-existing norms and institutions. One 
example is the well-established institution of slavery that Islam recognized 
and accepted, yet attempted to adjust its circumstances through improving 
its conditions.197 The intent of the revelation was for the ultimate 
eradication of the institution by restricting its occurrence and encouraging 
its abolition, but An-Na‟im finds that “since there was no internal 
mechanism by which slavery was to be rendered unlawful by Shari‟a it 
continued to be lawful under that system of law up to the present day.”198 
In the case of women, the Qur‟an could improve their status but not 
radically modify their position, because such a fundamental change in the 
social norms would have resulted in upheaval and a total rejection of 
Islam.199 In the Medinan text, the organization of the Muslim community 
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was regulated through rules and legislation that consistent with that 
environment, such as the detailed rules concerning marriage, divorce and 
inheritance. While the detail and clarity of the text was useful and 
necessary in establishing the foundations of the first Muslim society, these 
guidelines were specific to that time and place. As Fazlur Rahman points 
out, “The Qur‟an, although it is the eternal Word of God, was, 
nevertheless, immediately addressing a given society with a specific social 
structure. This society could, legally speaking, be made to go only so far 
and no more.”200  
The two texts of the Qur‟an, however, are not mutually exclusive, 
Rahman explains the importance of both texts this way: “The Prophet 
could have, had he so chosen, indulged in merely grandiose moral 
formulas. But then he could not have erected a society. Therefore, a legal 
and a moral approach were both equally necessary.”201 The message of 
Medina has been elaborated and explained, its legal instructions offered 
for immediate application to create the first Muslim society, but the 
message of Mecca was only outlined and its moral principles await 
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implementation.202 Their elaboration and interpretation require a fresh 
understanding of the Qur‟an for which An-Na‟im‟s offers his methodology. 
The shift in emphasis from one set of Qur‟anic texts to the other 
entails an important rethinking of the Qur‟an and a reconstruction of the 
law it generates. An-Na‟im accepts that Islamic law in the present day 
must be based upon the Qur‟an and Sunna. He clearly indicates that “it is 
not suggested here that Islamic law should simply follow developments in 
human history regardless of the provisions of the Qur‟an and Sunna.”203 
However, it should be emphasized that the approach to those sources as 
well as the concepts, ideas, and laws that are derived from them, are done 
through a process of human interpretation. In support of this An-Na‟im 
maintains, 
This principle should be easily appreciated by Muslims because 
even the Qur‟an, which they believe to be the literal and final word 
of God, clearly describes itself in verses 12:2 and 43:3 as 
something conveyed through the vehicle of the Arabic language in 
order to be reflected upon and understood through the faculty of 
reason. In verse 29:49, the Qur‟an describes itself as something 
which is understood and appreciated by the hearts and minds of 
those granted knowledge. Consequently, Muslims should realize 
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that they are always dealing with a human interpretation of their 
sacred sources rather than the sources per se.204 
 
In so doing, An-Na‟im emphasizes the significance and the scope 
of human interpretation in understanding the Qur‟an in order to convince 
Muslims that his conceptual proposal is viable and legitimate. It is not 
merely a reinterpretation of the Shari‟a that he seeks but a critical 
adjustment in how the Islamic texts themselves are regarded.  
An-Na‟im begins with an inquiry into how the Islamic scriptures are 
conceived by the legal interpreter. He argues that those texts and their 
normative implications can only be understood in terms of the knowledge 
and experience of the world by the reader and that since the world 
changes over time, this knowledge and experience changes. This 
hermeneutical principle leads him to argue that “Islam should not be 
bound by any particular understanding of its scriptural sources.”205 If Islam 
is not bound to one interpretation because of the nature of narrative, An-
Na‟im can call for a fresh understanding of the sources. This would 
necessarily leads to a new legal structure, by which the principles of 
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Islamic law formulated by the classical jurists no longer remain as the only 
valid and applicable law.  
According to An-Na‟im, the transformation of such principles 
embodied in the Qur‟an is a consequence of awareness of the influence of 
historical context on the method and even content of their interpretation: 
In interpreting the primary sources of Islam in their historical 
context, the founding jurists of Shari‟a tended not only to 
understand the Qur‟an and Sunna as confirming existing social 
attitudes and institutions, but also to emphasize certain texts and 
“enact” them into Shari‟a while de-emphasizing other texts or 
interpreting them in ways consistent with what they believed to be 
the intent and purpose of the sources. Working with the same 
primary sources, modem Muslim jurists might shift emphasis from 
one class of texts to the other, and interpret the previously enacted 
texts in ways consistent with a new understanding of what is 
believed to be the intent and purpose of the sources. This new 
understanding would be informed by contemporary social, 
economic, and political circumstances in the same way that the 
“old” understanding on which Shari‟a jurists acted was informed by 
the then prevailing circumstances.206  
 
In sum, An-Na‟im believes that the public law of Shari‟a was, and 
still is, based more on the sources of the Medina period than those of the 
Mecca period. The founding jurists presumed a process of naskh 
(abrogation or repeal) of certain scriptural texts to reconcile the 
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inconsistencies that arose, in the hope of establishing comprehensive 
system of Shari‟a.207 According to Mahmoud Taha, naskh could not be 
permanent, since “there would be no point in having revealed the earlier 
texts.” As An-Na‟im says “naskh was an essentially logical and necessary 
process of implementing the appropriate texts and postponing the 
implementation of others until the right circumstances for their 
implementation should arise.”208 In this way, he argues that since Medinan 
conditions no longer existed, we should return to the original message of 
Mecca period. As a result, the basis of Shari‟a should be transformed from 
the texts of the Medinan to the earlier Meccan period. This hermeneutical 
shift, in fact, reverses the process of naskh, accordingly preserves those 
texts which were abrogated in the past into current law and abrogates 
texts which have been enacted as Shari‟a. The new body of law would be 
the modem Shari‟a. Upon the acceptance of the interpretation of the 
Qur‟an as an historical document which indicate that Islamic law must be 
proceed from the moral message revealed in Mecca, An-Na‟im suggests a 
reconciliation of the Shari‟a and international standards of human rights:  
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Thus we have Muslim demands for self-determination by the 
application of Islamic law in public life. Yet such Islamic law cannot 
possibly be Shari‟a as historically established. The only way to 
reconcile these competing imperatives for change in the public law 
of Muslim countries is to develop a version of Islamic public law 
which is compatible with modem standards of constitutionalism, 
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3.  Abou El Fadl and the Islamic Moral Commitment to Human 
Rights 
The last example of contemporary Muslim intellectual‟s effort to 
reconcile Islamic doctrine with the conception human rights which I briefly 
examine in this chapter is Khaled Abou El Fadl.210 He attempts to present 
a systematic exploration of Islamic legal theory as it associates with 
human rights. According to Abou El Fadl, the broad tradition of Islamic 
political morality could potentially support an idea of human rights. He 
argues that despite the doctrinal potentialities found in the Islamic 
tradition, without the necessary moral commitment there can be no 
conception of human rights in Islam. Such a moral commitment is not 
simply a function of political pragmatism or opportunism; instead, it 
requires that “the human agent plays a significant role” in the 
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determination of the morality on the basis of a rational inquiry into God‟s 
creation.211 
Abou El Fadl shows that a great deal of debate concerning the 
challenge of human rights within the Islamic tradition is associated with the 
idea of sovereignty of God.212 According to the predominant interpretation 
of the doctrine of God‟s sovereignty, God as the sole legislator and 
lawmaker seeks to regulate all human interactions, and that Shari‟a is a 
complete moral code that determines every possibility.213 Accordingly, any 
normative perspective which is derived from human reason or socio-
historical experiences is fundamentally unsound and unacceptable. The 
only acceptable normative principles are those derived from the divine 
commands as found in the Divine text.214 
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This idea of God‟s sovereignty leads to the denial of and hostility 
against any human-made system that is not grounded in the Divine text.215 
Instead, “all moral norms and principles ought to be derived from a sole 
source: the intent or will of the Divine.”216 Human beings must apply God‟s 
divine legislation and refrain from assuming any basic principles of what is 
right or wrong independent of His commands. In other words, a society 
must simply be ruled by the basic principles of the Islamic Shari‟a. As an 
eternal phenomenon, the Shari‟a requires the duties and rights of 
individuals and the state. Therefore, since legislation of the basic prin-
ciples of government and personal morality is sealed off from human 
knowledge, the doctrine of God‟s sovereignty constitutes the only 
acceptable basis for any legitimate moral and political system. 
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Such an interpretation of the idea of God‟s sovereignty, in fact, 
assumes that “human agents have complete access to the will of God.” 
Moreover, it supposes that there is a Divine law aimed at regulating all 
human interactions. This interpretation of God‟s sovereignty can be used 
for overcoming the agency of people in managing the affairs of their polity. 
This means “that only an elite will rule in God‟s name while pretending to 
implement the Divine will.”217 
However, Abou El Fadl argues that this conception of God‟s 
sovereignty is not justifiable by the principles of Islamic theology. He 
thinks that it is quite possible that,  
God leaves it to human beings to regulate their own affairs as long 
as they observe certain minimal standards of moral conduct and 
that such standards include the preservation and promotion of 
human dignity and well-being.218 
Therefore, the idea that God is sovereign does not provide grounds “to 
escape from the burdens of human agency.” 219 
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According to Abou El Fadl, the doctrine of God‟s sovereignty in 
classical Islamic thought is honoured in the search for the ways that 
human beings might be able to approach “God‟s beauty and justice.” He 
maintains that if God‟s sovereignty is used to argue that, 
[T]he only legitimate source of law is the Divine text and that human 
experience and intellect are irrelevant to the pursuit of the Divine 
will, then the idea of Divine sovereignty will always stand as an 
instrument of authoritarianism … . But that authoritarian view 
denigrates God‟s sovereignty.220  
 
Thus, he argues that the problem of God‟s sovereignty and human 
freedom in the Islamic doctrine needs to be analyzed through a proper 
understanding of the epistemology of Shari‟a. This suggests that between 
the Islamic fundamentals and human rights lies a role for human agency, 
both of which – in an interpretive process – can be realized in a Muslim 
society. Abou El Fadl emphasizes that the role of the human agency in 
such an interpretive process is not only admitted by Shari‟a discourses, 
but it is in fact indispensable to the understanding of the limits of 
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interpretation in the face of the perfection of the Divine.221 Let me now 
briefly examine this epistemic-hermeneutic debate on Shari‟a. 
Pre-modern Muslim jurists have investigated the issue whether or 
not every jurist was correct in his interpretation. In this regard, the jurists 
were divided into two schools. The first school known as the Mukhatti’a 
argued, 
[T]hat every legal problem ultimately has a correct answer; 
however, only God knows the correct response, and the truth will 
not be revealed until the Final Day… . In this sense, every mujtahid 
[jurist] is correct in trying to find the answer; however, one reader 
might reach the truth while the rest might mistake it.222  
 
And the second school, known as the Musawwiba, argued that, 
[T]here is no specific and correct answer (hukm mu’ayyan) that 
God wants human beings to discover; after all, if there were a 
correct answer, God would have made the evidence indicating a 
divine rule conclusive and clear… . Human beings are not charged 
with the obligation of finding some abstract or inaccessible, legally 
correct result. Rather, they are charged with the duty to diligently 
investigate a problem and then follow the result of their own ijtihad 
(judgment or opinion). … [W]hat God wants or intends is for human 
beings to search – to live a life fully and thoroughly engaged with 
the divine…. In sum, if a person honestly and sincerely believes 
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that such and such is the law of God, then for that person it is in 
fact God‟s law.223 
 
Based on this intellectual tradition, Abou El Fadl suggests that 
“Shari‟a ought to stand in an Islamic polity as a symbolic construct for the 
divine perfection that is unreachable by human effort.”224 The central idea 
in both attitudes is the matter of human determination. In fact, both 
schools seek to reach God‟s law, but whether it is the actual law of God is 
beyond human knowledge. So what remains it is just human 
understanding or fiqh. 
According to an Islamic religious epistemology, there is a 
fundamental distinction between Shari‟a and fiqh. It has been argued that 
“Shari‟a is the Divine ideal, and that fiqh is the human effort to understand 
and apply this ideal. Shari‟a is perfect, true and immutable – fiqh is not.”225 
In other words, “Shari‟a as conceived by God is flawless, but as 
understood by human beings, it is imperfect and contingent.” In fact, 
Shari‟a as the ideal of God‟s law is considered as a metaphysical entity 
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distinct from human attempts to understand it. On this view, “Shari‟a is not 
merely a set of positive rules but also a set of principles and a discursive 
process that searches for the Divine ideals. As such, it is a work in 
progress that is never complete.”226   
What we can conclude, so far, is that a juristic statement on divine 
command is merely the potential law of God, whether because we will find 
its rightness on the Last Day (according to the first school) or because its 
rightness is depending “on the sincerity of belief of the person” who 
follows it (according to the second school).227 Given this religious 
epistemological principle, Abou El Fadl convincingly argues that,  
If a legal opinion is adopted and enforced by the state, it cannot be 
said to be God‟s law. By passing through the determinative and 
enforcement processes of the state, the legal opinion is no longer 
simply a potential – it has become an actual law, applied and 
enforced. But what has been applied and enforced is not God‟s law 
– it is the state‟s law.228 
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Therefore, “a religious state law is a contradiction in terms.”229 He 
emphasizes that, 
 [T]he state may enforce the dominant subjective commitments of 
the community (the second school), or it may enforce what the 
majority believes to be closer to the divine ideal (the first school). 
But in either case, what is being enforced is not the law of God.230  
This indicates that the laws formulated and applied in a government are 
completely and absolutely secular, and must be treated as such. 
It is important to note that, while we can say that moral ends may 
derive from divine commands, we cannot say that any set of laws that 
attempts to fulfill this moral commitment is divine as well. So, Abou El Fadl 
argues that “Muslims might be able to assert that justice and mercy are 
universal moral values.” They might even be capable to realize that 
“justice and mercy are part of the divine charge to humanity – God wants 
human beings to be just and merciful.”231  In the remaining of this chapter, 
I briefly explain Abou El Fadl‟s argument on how justice, as a core moral 
value, can promote a commitment to human rights in Muslims‟ political 
morality.  
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According to Abou El Fadl, “justice plays a central role in the 
Qur‟anic discourse.” Justice is asserted as an obligation we owe to God, 
and also to one another. Thus, “the imperative of justice is tied to the 
obligations of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil and the necessity 
of bearing witness on God‟s behalf.”232 Although the Qu‟ran does not 
provide a conception of justice, “it emphasizes the ability to achieve justice 
as a unique human charge and need.”233  
Abou El Fadl elaborates on the Muslim jurists‟ arguments for justice 
on the basis of the idea of social cooperation. The jurists argued that “God 
created humans weak and in need of cooperation with others in order to 
limit their ability to commit injustice.” They maintained that without social 
cooperation, people are not able to defeat injustice, or establish justice. 
The jurists asserted that “God has created human beings diverse and 
different from each other, so that they will need each other.” This need will 
make them increase their natural tendency to cooperate in achieving 
justice.234 Thus, the relative weakness of human beings and their 
                                               
 
232
 Ibid., p.18. 
233
 Ibid., p.18. Rahman also discussed the obligation of justice in the Qur‟an, see, Fazlur 
Rahman, Major Themes in Qur’an, Second Edition (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 
1994), pp. 42-43. See also, Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur’an 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen‟s University Press, 2003), pp. 205-61. 
234
 Abou El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, p.19. “This juristic discourse is 
partly based on the Qur‟anic statement that God created people different from one 
159 
 
remarkable diverse abilities will encourage people to engage in fair social 
cooperation.235  
Abou El Fadl argues that the Qur‟anic celebration and blessing of 
human diversity may encourage the pursuit of social justice and may 
create “various possibilities for a moral commitment to human rights” in 
modern Islam. He explains that this commitment,  
[C]ould be developed into an ethic that respects dissent and 
honors the right of human beings to be different, including the right 
to adhere to different religious or nonreligious convictions…. 
Furthermore, it could be developed into a notion of delegated 
powers, in which the ruler is entrusted with serving the core value 
of justice by ensuring the right of assembly, cooperation, and 
dissent. Even more, a notion of limits could be developed that 
would restrain the government from derailing the quest for justice 
or from hampering the right of the people to cooperate, or dissent, 
in this quest. Importantly, if the government failed to discharge the 
obligations of its covenant, it would lose its legitimate claim to 
power.236  
 
The important point here is that justice requires that every member 
of society have at least some basic rights which should be secured. “A 
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society that fails in this task is neither merciful nor just.”237 This point 
suggests the possibility of basic individual rights in Islamic doctrine. 
Abou El Fadl states that, the pre-modern Islamic juristic tradition did 
not formulate a conception of individual rights as entitlements, but the 
juristic tradition did formulate an idea of protected fundamental interests of 
individuals. In the Islamic jurisprudential theory, “the interests of the 
people divided into three categories: the necessities (daruriyyat), the 
needs (hajiyyat), and the luxuries (kamaliyyat or tahsiniyyat).” Major 
institutions of a legitimate state must satisfy these interests; “in 
descending order of importance: first, necessities, then needs, then 
luxuries.” In the juristic tradition, “the necessities are further divided into 
five basic values (al-daruriyyat al-khamsah): religion, life, intellect, lineage 
or honor, and property.”238  
Although “the Muslim jurists did not develop the five basic values as 
broad categories” to include social and political content, yet, this does not 
prevent the possibility that the above-mentioned values could play as a 
foundation for a theory of basic individual rights in the modern Islam. 
Therefore, Abou El Fadl argues that the protection of religion should be 
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developed to mean the right of religious freedom; the protection of life 
should mean the right of life; the protection of the intellect should include 
the right to freedom of thought and expression; the protection of honor 
should mean the protection of human dignity; and the protection of 
property should mean “the right to compensation for the taking of 
property”.239 
Arguing that the juristic tradition did not develop a conception of 
basic individual rights does not mean that that tradition was unaware of 
the idea. By contrast, as Abou El Fadl shows, the juristic tradition has 
expressed sympathy with people who have been “unjustly executed for 
their faith or those who died fighting against injustice.” Muslim jurists have 
“condemned the imposition of unfair taxes and the usurpation of private 
property by the government.”240 Importantly, the majority of Muslim jurists 
did not condemn rebellion against a tyrannical government.241  
Broadly speaking, Muslim jurists have expressed some views which 
demonstrate their humanitarian sentiments. For example, they “developed 
the idea of presumption of innocence in all criminal and civil proceedings 
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and argued that the accuser always carries the burden of proof (al-bayyina 
‘ala man idda’a).” In matters related to criminal cases, “the jurists argued 
that it is always better to release a guilty person than to run the risk of 
punishing an innocent person.” The same principle was applied on issues 
associated with heresy: “Muslim jurists repeatedly argued that it is better 
to let a thousand heretics go free than to wrongfully punish a single 
sincere Muslim.”242 In addition, the jurists argued that heterodox groups 
may not be annoyed or assaulted until “they carry arms and form a clear 
intent to rebel against the government.” Importantly, Muslim jurists also 
… condemned the use of torture, arguing that the Prophet forbade 
the use of muthla (mutilations) in all situations, and they opposed 
the use of coerced confessions in all legal and political matters.243  
 
However, Abou El Fadl argues that the most challenging debate on 
individual rights in the Islamic juristic tradition is associated with “the rights 
of God and the rights of people.” The rights of God should be retained by 
God in terms that God alone can judge how the violation of these rights 
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can be punished and God alone has the right to forgive such violations.244 
Moreover, Muslim jurists argued that “all rights not explicitly retained by 
God” will be maintained by people. However, “while violations of God‟s 
rights are only forgiven by God through adequate acts of repentance, the 
rights of people may be forgiven only by the people.”245 Importantly the 
jurists asserted that “if the rights of God and rights of people (mixed rights) 
overlap, in most cases, the rights of people should prevail.” The 
justification for this idea has been that human beings need their rights and 
need to claim those rights here and now, but the rights of God are merely 
for the benefit of human beings, and “God can vindicate God‟s rights in the 
Hereafter if needed.”246 
                                               
 
244
 Classical jurists identified most acts of worship, and prescribed punishments in Qur‟an 
as part of the rights of God. For example, fasting during the month of Ramadan, praying 
five times a day, or the punishment for adultery are parts of the rights of God. They made 
distinction between acts of ‘ibadat (worship) and mu’amalat (conduct involving social 
interaction). ‘Ibadat, were ascribed to the rights of God, while most mu’amalat were 
ascribed to the rights of people. Ironically, modern fundamentalists have declined the 
distinction between the two categories, claiming that all conduct, including social 
interactions, fall within the realm of ‘ibadat, and then claiming that the State is responsible 
for enforcing the rights of God on this world and that the rights of God take priority over 
the rights of people. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Human Rights Commitment in 
Modern Islam,” p, 362. 
245
 Abou El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, pp. 25-26. For instance, “a right 
to compensation is retained individually by a human being and may only be forgiven by 
the aggrieved individual. Neither the government nor God has the right to forgive or 
compromise such a right of compensation if it is designated as part of the rights of human 
beings.” Ibid. 
246
 Ibid., p. 27. 
164 
 
As noted above, with regard to individual rights, Muslim jurists did 
not suggest a set of definite and universal rights that should be possessed 
by each individual. Instead, they have  
… conceived individual rights as emerging from a legal cause 
produced by the suffering of a legal wrong. … a person does not 
possess a right until he or she has been wronged and obtains a 
claim for retribution or compensation as a result.247  
 
Thus, Abou El Fadl suggests that the transforming of this traditional 
conception of immunities to a modern conception of rights requires a 
paradigm shift. In so doing, “[the] rights become the property of individual 
holders, regardless of whether there is a legal cause of action.”248 The set 
of rights which are considered as fundamental are those required to 
achieve a decent society. The five values mentioned earlier could be 
regarded as the fundamental individual rights if those values properly 
reconstruct in the light of the diversity of human condition. In this way, the 
idea of juristic tradition concerning the priority of rights of people over the 
rights of God should be understood as “a claimed right of God may not be 
used to violate the rights of human beings.”249 In general terms, a basic 
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principle of Shari‟a is that, all laws are for the benefit of human beings.250 
Here and now, we should only be concerned with exploring and the 
establishment of the rights which are required to achieve a just society. 
According to this understanding, the moral commitment to human rights 
does not in itself entail a lack of commitment to God, instead it represents 
a “necessary part of celebrating human diversity, honouring God‟s 






                                               
 
250
 Abou El Fadl emphasizes that in the Qur‟anic discourse, God is beyond benefit or 
harm, and therefore divine commands are in fact intended to benefit human beings alone 
and not God. For an elaboration on this point, see Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in 
God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001), pp. 32-33.   
251
 Abou El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, p. 28. Abou El Fadl explains 
that “it is not the premodern juristic tradition that poses the greatest barrier to the 
development of individual rights in Islam. Rather, the most serious obstacle comes from 
modern Muslims themselves. Especially in the last half of the past century, a 
considerable number of Muslims have made the unfounded assumption that Islamic law 
is concerned primarily with duties, and not rights, and that the Islamic conception of rights 





In this dissertation, I have argued that Rawls‟ theory of global 
normative order presents a set of principles of justice and rights applicable 
to international law and practice which, if followed, would lead to the 
creation of a just, stable and peaceful world. The resulting global order 
would be a realistic utopia; respect for human rights would be guaranteed 
by societies cooperating with each other in accordance with principles that 
secure and advance their legitimate interests. Such a world would be 
more just and peaceful than ours now is. And, in principle, it is possible to 
realize such a global order even given the realities of human nature and 
cultural diversity. 
Rawls has shown that human rights, as he understands them, have 
a very strong foundation: they can be justified by means of the analysis of 
idea of a well-ordered society. His arguments do not presuppose any 
particular comprehensive doctrine, nor do they presuppose any 
particularly liberal conception of justice. Instead, giving the idea of human 
rights as an essential element of an idea of global public reason, Rawls 
argues that the justification of human rights needs to be “formulated in 
terms that can plausibly be shared;” the idea necessarily means that a 
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conception of human rights and its content “cannot be formulated by 
reference to a particular religious or secular moral outlook.”252 
Human rights, here are understood as the broad requirements of 
justice that are consistent with all reasonable political moralities include 
“liberal” and nonliberal “decent” peoples. In other words, human rights are 
a “proper subset” of the rights of members recognized and secured in any 
society that is (at least) decent. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, the 
idea of human rights cannot meet the agreement of all reasonable peoples 
if it draws on ethical or religious traditions that they do not share. It was 
the central idea of this dissertation that, diverse reasonable traditions each 
with complex dynamical structures and incompatible patterns of argument 
can develop the basis for a shared view of human rights with their own 
rational. As Abdullahi An-Na‟im indicates, 
If international human rights standards are to be implemented in a 
manner consistent with their own rationale, the people (who are to 
implement these standards) must perceive the concept of human 
rights and its content as their own. To be committed to carrying out 
human rights standards, people must hold these standards as 
emanating from their worldview and values.253  
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However, it is important to note that one should not identify the 
content of an idea of human rights “by taking an empirical survey of the 
values that different societies happen to share”254 and searching for 
inherent compatibility. Instead, affirming of a freestanding conception of 
human rights, as a normative inquiry, requires reconstruction or revision of 
the ethical and religious traditions by their adherents. As my reading of 
works of Muslim intellectuals should demonstrate, the Islamic 
fundamentals can be interpreted in a way that is compatible with a 
freestanding conception of human rights.  
In the Islamic context, the most challenging issue associated with a 
conception of human rights is the idea of God‟s legislative sovereignty 
which revealed in the Qur‟an and its relation to any claim of rights. This 
issue goes back to the debate between two most influential pre-modern 
theological and ethical schools, namely, the Mu‟tazilite and the Ash‟arite 
on the case of conflict between God‟s revelation and human morality, 
which of the two gets priority. 255 
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The Ash‟arite school tends toward a “divine command theory,” 
believing that God‟s commands alone determine morality.256 This issue 
was addressed by Socrates in his dialogue with Euthyphro. He asked: “Is 
the pious or holy beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it 
is beloved by the gods?”257  Socrates favored the first alternative. He 
argued that “goodness or rightness or holiness is neither explained nor 
constituted by the gods loving it or approving it or willing it. On the 
contrary: what is good or right or holy is good or right or holy 
independently of anyone‟s attitudes toward it –including those of the 
gods.”258 Contrary to Socrates‟ view, the Ash‟ariyya argued that good 
actions are good just because God commanded them, and evil are evil 
because God prohibited them.259 But, the Mu‟tazilite school endorsed a 
form of natural law theory: God has revealed moral law to human beings, 
and has prescribed obedience to it, but the moral law is intrinsically good. 
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The Mu‟tazila held that “by investigation of general goods, we can move 
from empirical inquiry of harms and benefits to a determination of divine 
command.”260 The Ash‟ariyya, on the contrary, believed that only God‟s 
commands define standards of right and wrong as well as good and evil. 
In other words, on the Ash‟arite view, the moral quality of an act is 
completely independent of its consequences. Only the command of God 
determines an act as right or wrong independently of any human 
assessment of resulting benefit or harm. From such a strict position, some 
Ash‟ariyya even insisted, if God commands an act which seems wrong, it 
would be right for human beings to do it.261 
Thus, the Ash‟ariyya asserted the sovereignty of God at the 
expense of human freedom; they believed that God is unbound by any 
moral standards. Two characteristics of Ash‟ariyya are particularly 
important: the first is holding a pessimistic view on the ability of human 
intellectual faculties to make ethical judgments. If God‟s commands are 
the only normative source of “right” and “wrong”, then the moral 
knowledge can only be gained through revelation. The second is 
supporting a form of Scripturalism. Given the conviction that God‟s 
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commands alone are the normative source of right and wrong, and deep 
suspicion of human intellectual faculties, the only way is to comply with 
definite commands of God.262 In this sense, the Ash‟arite school is 
positivist as it expected that one must search explicit scriptural text for 
authority and clarity of divine commands. 
On the contrary, the Mu‟tazilite claimed that the sources of 
normativity (morality) are recognizable by reason or intuition, and not by 
text alone. According to the Mu‟tazila, God, as well as human beings, is 
bound by moral principles, and therefore any religious text that seems 
inconsistent with moral standards must have been incorrectly interpreted. 
More precisely, on the Mu‟tazilite view, God does not violate morality, that 
is God could not commit evil and injustice. Although, the Mu‟tazila 
believed that “right” and “wrong” recognizable through reason and 
revelation, and the two sources of knowledge are always reconcilable, 
they argued that right and wrong have an objective reality that exist in a 
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state of nature. Therefore morality is inherent and recognized, but not 
constituted by mere scriptural text.263 
Muslim intellectuals are engaged and in conversation with this 
historical experience of Islamic humanism.264 I consider the three 
intellectuals, treated here as clear examples. As pious and rationalist 
Muslims – self-identified as neo-Mu‟tazila – building upon the heritage of 
Mu‟tazilite rationalism, they firmly believe in the compatibility of Islam and 
modernity, a distinction between divine law and its interpretation, and the 
diversity of religious traditions. The neo-Mu‟tazila are approaching Islam 
both from within and without, and combining contemporary intra-religious 
and extra-religious knowledge. The heart of their theory is the assertion 
that no religious interpretation is ever complete and final. They argued that 
religion may be divine, but interpretation of it is simply human, that is 
fallible and social-historically constructed. Muslim intellectuals assumed 
that the text, sacred or not, never speaks for itself; instead, it always 
manifests meaning through the dialogical enterprise of the reader of the 
text. The role of human agency in the interpretive process exceeds 
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beyond the determination of the law. The neo-Mu‟tazila believed that, 
Shari‟a is not simply about substantive law; instead, it is a way of thinking 
about “the relationship between the Divine will, human interpretation, and 
human reality.”265 
Like the Mu‟tazila, Muslim intellectuals not only acknowledge that 
the moral obligations may come from God, but they maintain that God 
through His pure and profound wisdom obligates people to avoid 
corruption and to achieve benefits. In so doing, they argue that once 
Muslims are able to assert that the moral obligation might be constituted 
by divine commands, but the corruption and benefit are qualities subject to 
rational inquiry, this will lead to a major advancement in the attempt to 
justify a conception of human rights within Islamic tradition.266 
However, one could ask what an Islamic formulation of a 
conception of human rights would be. The key elements of such a 
formulation are that it should be both acceptable to global public reason 
(i.e., an affirmation of the freestanding conception of human rights) and 
adequately Islamic, that is to be plausible to believers (i.e., to provide that 
tradition with its most compelling statement). This enterprise can be 
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understood as the search for a certain type of equilibrium: how might a 
formulation of Islamic doctrine be included in an overlapping consensus 
on a freestanding conception of human rights?  
As we have seen, a crucial problem of formulation a conception of 
human rights in Islamic tradition arose from a particular interpretation of 
the idea of sovereignty of God. It was argued that because the contents of 
right and wrong are given primarily by the firm and determinate rules of 
God (expressed in Shari‟a,) the faithful Muslim should obey firmly and 
uncritically the authority of Shari‟a and should attempt to enforce God‟s 
rules.  
Therefore, any deviation from God‟s sovereignty whether legal, 
political, or even personal is a corruption of true Islam. Any kind of 
submission to human – social, political, or individual – impressions, are 
considered as unbelief. In this view, although God‟s domain covers both 
the ordinary and the spiritual life, its implication is mostly related to 
politics.267 The divine law determines moral rules and Muslim‟s political 
identity. So the Shari‟a becomes the only meaningful law and the Islamic 
political system the only acceptable polity. These arguments are used to 
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justify the conflict between political Islam (the fundamentalists) and liberal 
democracy, because of the presumed inherent incompatibility between 
Islamic doctrine and modern thought.  
So, this interpretation of the idea of sovereignty of God is followed 
by some figures and movements within the Muslim world which 
consequently deny the idea that Islamic societies must secure the basic 
rights for each person. This interpretation supports fundamental rights only 
for those who are able to act rightly; freedom of thought and expression 
for those with correct beliefs, and freedom of assembly for those who are 
prepared to forbid the wrong.268  
But the alternative interpretation of the idea of sovereignty of God 
leads to a different conclusion. It argues that God has created human 
beings with the intellectual capacity to understand the requirements of 
God‟s law. In fact, this interpretation of God‟s sovereignty argues in favor 
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of the ability of human beings to acquire knowledge of the substance of 
God‟s commands (obligations and prohibitions) by reference to benefits 
and harms associated with actions. Three ideas are essential to this 
formulation. The first idea indicates a conceptual distinction between the 
true and eternal statements of law as set down by God (i.e. Shari‟a) and 
the human understanding of the law, which is theory-laden, contextual and 
fallible.269 Acknowledging and giving sufficient weight to this distinction 
between Shari‟a and its human interpretation creates spaces for the 
disagreement and error which are unavoidable in human interpretive 
activities, and also for endeavors to improve understanding of Shari‟a and 
reinterpreting it under changing conditions.  
The second idea is the compatibility between God‟s sovereignty 
and human responsibility. The sovereignty of God is to give final judgment 
on the sincerity of faith and righteousness of acts, and that the 
responsibility of man is to provide instructions of moral duties. Related to 
this idea is the principle that “there shall be no compulsion in religion” 
(2:256). Along with asserting the previous two ideas we may have a case 
for more extensive guarantees of basic rights, as conditions of social 
cooperation and the fulfillment of the responsibility of all human beings. 
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The final idea is that the plurality and diversity of religious 
communities not only is a natural human condition but also is a will of 
God. Religious pluralism is not a product of the misunderstanding and 
antagonism of a group of religious community; rather it is a consequence 
of multilateral structure of the reality meeting the demand of human 
perception.270 Moreover, the diversity of religious traditions has manifested 
itself that God may favor this pluralism.271 In sum, if the initial two ideas 
can provide a basis to extend fundamental rights to all members in an 
Islamic community, bring them together with the third idea suggests a 
sound basis to support a freestanding conception of human rights as an 
essential part of global ethics. 272 
As I have interpreted in this dissertation, an approach that one may 
call “Rawlsian global ethics: the search of an overlapping consensus.” 
Rawls has proposed a form of non-public reasoning for defending a 
political conception of human rights from within distinct ethical traditions. 
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Rawls defined this form of nonpublic reasoning as arguing “from what we 
believe, or conjecture, are other people‟s basic doctrines, religious or 
secular, and trying to show them that, despite what they may think, they 
can still endorse a reasonable political conception that can provide a basis 
for public reasons.”273 
I have examined the capacity of a given comprehensive religious 
doctrine and whether it can gain an overlapping consensus on a 
freestanding conception of human rights. Taking Islam as a reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine and exploring theoretical potentialities within that 
tradition; my aim was to show what kind of authentic and reasonable 
affirmation can be presented by an ethical tradition.  
The idea of an overlapping consensus – in this case – serves to 
show how a just and stable global order is possible. In order to achieve 
this aim we should assume that “there are many reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that understand the wider realm of values to be 
congruent with, or supportive of, or else not in conflict with, political values 
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as these are specified by a political conception of justice”274 and human 
rights.     
Thus, the idea of political liberalism can be educative; teaching us 
about new political possibilities and about neglected aspects of our own 
comprehensive doctrine. The basic moral and political ideas and values 
such as toleration, inclusion, and cooperation might not be prominent in a 
reasonable ethical or religious tradition. But, the advancement of a political 
conception of justice and right can lead to revise a reasonable ethical or 
religious tradition and its winning the support of an overlapping 
consensus.275 In addition, it may provide moral interest in building a liberal 
democracy by showing how liberal theory specifies and combines those 
values.  
As we have seen, the major feature of Muslim Intellectuals‟ 
arguments for reformulation of Islamic political morality was as follows: the 
type of political system which Muslims create and justify, whether 
monarchical, dictatorial or democratic depends on their very 
presuppositions. These presuppositions exist prior to their understanding 
                                               
 
274
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.169. 
275
 Rawls mentions that an example of how a religion may do this is An-Na‟im, Toward an 
Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human rights, and International Law, esp. pp. 69-
100. See John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in LP, p. 151.  
180 
 
of the Divine text, and their attempts to construct a political order through 
practical reasoning.  
In their efforts to reformulate Islamic doctrine, Muslim intellectuals 
have shown interest in critical rationalism, and the ideas of pluralism, 
progress, and secularism. They believed that modernity is an inevitable 
process of change in the historical development of human societies. 
Although Muslim intellectuals prized modernity, they remained critical and 
arguing that an Islamic society “can enjoy the freedoms of modern 
democratic government without ignoring the existence of God.”276 They 
acknowledged that shared basis of justice and human rights can be 
formulated in a variety of ways, through different ethical and religious 
traditions. 
The term of “global ethics” does not mean that we think there is 
only one global set of answers appropriate to all contexts. Instead, it 
means that we, holders of different ethical and religious doctrines, should 
be open to reasoning from anywhere that deals with our situation. So, we 
might better understand the implications of Rawls‟ conception of human 
rights and the idea of decent society if we take seriously the moral and 
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political thoughts in neo- Mu‟tazila intellectuals. At the same time, Muslim 
intellectuals might better understand the implications of their own political 






















AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI’S IDEA OF ISLAMIC STATE AND ITS 
COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
In the first part of this dissertation, I have explained that Rawls‟ 
conception of human rights is distinct from and narrower than his 
conception of justice (i.e., justice as fairness). Rawls conceives human 
rights as minimal, but necessary requirements of justice – although not 
sufficient from a liberal point of view –that can be satisfied, at least in 
principle, by various political systems, not only by a constitutional 
democratic regime. Therefore, he argues that human rights are common 
to all peoples, since they are compatible with all reasonable political 
moralities, including those of both “liberal” and “decent hierarchical” 
peoples. By contrary, the dominant maximalist theories of human rights 
reject Rawls‟ significant demarcation between human rights and justice, 
and claim that human rights require a liberal democratic state. Adopting 
this maximalist view, some of Iranian intellectuals claim that the 
reconciliation of human rights (as an essential element of modern ethics) 
and religion (as a traditional world-view and value) is not feasible.  
But, as we have seen, Rawls‟ theory of global normative order 
attempts to put no unnecessary obstacles on affirming a conception of 
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human rights by tying its formulation to a particular religious or ethical 
comprehensive doctrine. It is left to different ethical and religious doctrines 
to elaborate a shared basis of human rights within their own terms. One of 
the most noticeable instances that show how it is possible to achieve a 
reconciliation of religious morality and human rights in Islamic legal 
tradition is the valuable intellectual insights and honest practical 
commitment of the late Ayatollah Montazeri.277 The life of that great man 
which was rife with love to truth and compassion towards people is a 
typical religious instance of defense of justice and rights of the citizens 
especially the deprived and the depressed ones. For instance, his 
endeavor to guarantee the right to due process of law associated with 
political dissenters and his quarrel with Ayatollah Khomeini over the mass 
execution of political prisoners in the first decade of the Islamic revolution 
as well as his recent juristic opinion on the recognition of Baha‟is civil 
rights are worth to be mentioned.   
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In some of his recent works, Ayatollah Montazeri especially dealt 
with the issue of human rights.  Montazeri‟s effort to affirm an idea of 
human rights in his Resaleh Huqooq (A Treatise on Rights),278 which is full 
of reference to Qur‟anic verses and Hadith, Fatwas (juristic opinions) and 
theological arguments, deserves scrutiny and contemplation. At the 
beginning of the Treatise, Montazeri acknowledges human rights as the 
right of membership in a political community on the basis of social 
contract. As he writes, “What meant here are the rights which belong to 
people on the basis of legislation and contract” (Treatise, p. 12). He 
enumerates the fundamental human rights comprising of the rights to life, 
self- determination, personal property, freedom of thought and speech, as 
well as bodily and social security (Treatise, p. 15).  
Montazeri supports the freedom of speech and conscience, as the 
most important rights which every human being should possess, in a way 
that is compatible with the most important doctrine of modern ethics, 
namely the ideal of personal autonomy which entails the ability of 
individuals to choose, revise, and change their conception of the good. He 
states that, 
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A human being by nature has the ability to think and to choose a 
religious conviction. Islam has recognized the possibility of applying 
this ability as a right. If someone arrives at a conviction after 
thought and scrutiny and he finds it as true and corresponding to 
reality, he cannot neglect it, as deemed by reason, and he is 
obliged to observe its implications (Treatise, pp. 21-22). 
 
Montazeri is clearly aware that this right is fundamental and 
indispensable. He argues that the indisputable right of self-determination 
requires not to be able to remove or restrict someone‟ freedom without 
any rational allowance or reliable canonical reason. The interesting thing 
is that in his opinion freedom of thought is not restricted to choosing a 
particular conviction, but he goes beyond and respects freedom of 
changing one‟s conviction: 
Having [freedom] of speech and conscience, expressing and 
changing them, and being aware of ideas and thoughts of others, is 
the right of every man and it shall not be associated with any kind 
of religious offenses like apostasy, corrupting, degenerating, 
affront, calumny, and the like (Treatise,  pp. 50-52).  
 
In so doing, Montazeri strongly supports ensuring and securing of 
the basic rights of religious minorities in an Islamic state. He writes,  
In the modern world that countries have constitutions which specify 
the rights of groups and individuals; voting of the religious minority 
groups to the constitution as a national covenant, has the same 
weight as practice of dhimmah [a traditional principle to protect 
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Jews and Christians‟ rights in Muslim world]. Therefore, they enjoy 
the same rights and responsibilities as possessed by the other 
members of society (Treatise, pp.121-122).279 
 
In addition, Montazeri supports the right of freely flourishing life for the 
religious minorities in accordance with their own traditions.  
In support of the idea of human dignity and equality which he 
considered as a basic and underlying principle for other legislated laws, 
Montazeri cites and interprets Imam Ali‟s statement that “…people are 
divided into two groups; either they are similar to you in religion (religious 
brothers and sisters) or are alike you in Kind (creation)” (cited in Treatise, 
p.35). He points out that Imam Ali regards brotherhood in religion 
(conviction) equal to humanity and being of the same kind and attaches no 
preference in terms of rights for the mere conviction. Montazeri continues 
to support this idea by referring to some traditions (Hadith) on 
recommending fairness, toleration, love and compassion in treating all 
human beings. He says that such traditions generally demonstrate that not 
only treating people disrespectfully is morally wrong, but that “all human 
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beings regardless of their religion, faith or conviction have inherent dignity” 
(Treatise, p.35). 
An important point to note here is that although it has often been 
said that a virtuous man enjoys both inherent (or potential) and actual 
dignities, Montazeri argues that this presumed actual dignity has no effect 
on civil and social rights of people, and that all individuals enjoy these 
rights regardless of the degree of their faith and devotion. As he writes: 
If religiosity (or devotion) is considered as the source of rights for 
human beings, then the rights of the individuals should decrease or 
increase, weaken or strengthen on the basis of strength and 
weakness of the individuals‟ true beliefs. While this is not absolutely 
the case, and the strength and weakness of the individuals‟ true 
beliefs is only the source of spiritual dignity and being valuable 
before God (Treatise, p. 37). 
 
His most important argument in defending the inherent dignity therefore is 
that, the affirmation of human dignity without ensuring and securing a set 
of civil and social rights is neither reasonable nor possible.  
One of the basic rights which Rawls enumerates under human 
rights proper is the formal equality that is (in judicial system) equal cases 
must be treated equally. Montazeri also addresses this right and says: “all 
people have equal rights before the tribunal. Court should not be making 
any difference between the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong.” 
He argues that the unjust and discriminatory treating persons involve 
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postponing or preventing an individual to enjoy her/his rights. He 
strengthens this argument by Imam Ali’s statement that, “the judge should 
treat both parties in the tribunal in equal ways in every manner; equally 
looking and pointing at them, and inserting them in equal places.” 
According to Montazeri, the significant point which this statement 
highlights the process of treating people equally, particularly when issuing 
a verdict (Treatise, pp.91-92, all of the quotations in this paragraph). 
Among the human rights which Montazeri conceives as basic, are 
economic rights such as the right to occupation and trade. Referring to the 
Qur‟anic verse that, “[…] in their wealth there is a due share for the beggar 
and the deprived” (70: 19), he emphasizes the duty of the government to 
assist the less-advantaged members of society through various forms of 
subsidies (Treatise, pp.53-57).  
The important basic right that has not been mentioned in 
Montazeri‟s account is women‟s human rights. He briefly addressed the 
family rights, more precisely the traditional role and status of women that 
is articulated in the Islamic jurisprudence (which are faced with the 
fundamental challenges and criticism formulated by Muslim feminism). 
However, as I have explained in the second chapter, the right of 
dissention against the government‟s policy is one of the important basic 
rights which a decent society is required to secure. In fact, this right 
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presents a mechanism for legal and political reform in a decent 
hierarchical society. Montazeri points out that through the political 
participation, “all the members of society can legitimately express their 
own ideas and opinions to reform and change the strategies of the 
government.” In Islamic tradition, this important right and responsibility is 
known as the principle of “commanding right and forbidding wrong.” 
According to this principle, the government should consult the people or 
their representatives and hear their opinions. It also implies that the 
governors have to respect people‟s rights to take control over the 
conditions under which they live and act, and have to respect the public 
concern about any unjust political practice. So the government does not 
have right to force anything upon its people. As Imam Ali says:  
People would not be able to give their benevolent advice to the 
rulers if they lack the power to check the abuse of the authority. 
The rulers should govern their subjects in a manner which they feel 
their government is fair and not to be felled (cited in Treatise, pp. 
62-63). 
 
Thus, similar to Rawls‟ idea of decent hierarchical regime, 
Montazeri holds that an Islamic decent society not only requires to 
securing human rights by its political and social institutions, but also it 
should ensure the meaningful role of the members of the society for 
making political decisions, that is, the right to determine the form of the 
government and the mutual duties of justice between the rulers and their 
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subjects. Furthermore, he argues that “in an Islamic government, people 
are the main source of legitimacy.” In this way, he suggests the significant 
condition of the moral legitimacy of state:  
Whatever the members of an Islamic society determine the social 
and national interests are they could put them in the statement of 
their oath of allegiance to the government then the governors have 
the duty to fulfill these fundamental interests; if the government did 
not meet the promise, this would lead the government to lose its 
legitimacy (Treatise, p. 64). 
 
So far, in our comparative analysis, we examined some ideas in 
Montazeri‟s Treatise that affirm Rawls‟ second criterion for basic 
institutions of a decent society.280 Now we deal with Rawls‟ first criterion 
which says “the [decent] society does not have aggressive aims, and it 
recognizes that it must gain its legitimate ends through diplomacy and 
trade and other ways of peace” (LP, p. 64). In a similar way, Montazeri 
discusses issues associated with just war theory and the moral principles 
which should govern international relations. Let me briefly explain some of 
those ideas.   
Montazeri holds that an Islamic government should reject 
aggressive policies and must respect the internal sovereignty of other 
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nations. He emphasizes that “Muslim societies should not wage war 
against any nation that does not engage in war; the culture, laws and 
recognized borders of such a nation must be respected by Muslims.” 
Needless to say that cooperation and mutual understanding can lead to 
strengthening diplomatic practices. “The Muslim societies have the duty to 
respect all agreements concluded between them and other nations such 
as, international agreements and covenants which cannot be violated 
unilaterally.” He maintains that all arguments which have been offered in 
the Islamic juridical tradition for fulfillment to promises and contracts, they 
could be applied to international covenants (Treatise, p.115). 
Furthermore, Montazeri not only rejects aggressive approach 
towards other nations, but supports the priority of perpetual peace. He 
cites some traditions which encourage and recommend that “if a nation is 
asking for peace and acting it, you must desire it, too”. And, “if they offered 
peace, which enjoys God‟s consent, you should not reject it; since it brings 
relief for soldiers, and comfort and benefits the citizens” (Treatise, p.117). 
According to Montazeri, waging wars against other nations can only be 
justified for self-defense. Moreover, he offers an ethical and spiritual 
interpretation of jihad which denies territorial acquisition and political 
dominance: “the primary aim of jihad in Islam was not territorial acquisition 
or forcing people to accept Islam” (Treatise, p.117). 
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As I have explained in the first chapter, decent political regimes 
have duty of assisting other peoples. They have a moral commitment to 
assist the disadvantaged peoples in helping them to build their own 
institutions, and to terminate injustice and cruelty by using force on the 
“outlaw regimes” in order to observe the international laws. By drawing 
attention to these moral commitments, Montazeri states that “it is the duty 
of Muslims‟ communities (the Islamic ummah) to help liberation of the 
Muslim or non-Muslim peoples under rule of cruel and unjust regimes not 
being able to protect themselves.” He refers to Imam Ali‟s advice to his 
sons as follows: “Always be against unjust and help for the oppressed.” 
Thus, he supports engagement in humanitarian interventions and the 
efforts to make a more just and peaceful world. As he states: 
No government and no peoples have the right to intervene with the 
internal affairs of other peoples in matter of form of religion, 
government and so on, which are accepted by their subjects. 
However, the intervention based on international agreements and 
laws is justified in cases such as, a people dominated by an outlaw 
regime and ask [for help] from other peoples in order to change 
their dreadful situation, or problems associated with the nuclear 
weapons and international drug trade which threaten international 
security (Treatise, pp.118-119).  
 
As the concluding remarks, I think one of the most important 
models of a decent hierarchical regime is Ayatollah Montazeri‟s 
conception of an Islamic state. It has commitment to human rights and 
based on principles resembling Rawls‟ criteria of decency. He offers an 
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Islamic government in terms of an idea of guardianship of jurist, one 
elected by the people or their representatives.  However, one cannot take 
this conception as an ideal political theory, but, it can be categorized as a 
reasonable political theory, if we regard it as an alternative to an outlaw 
regime, and generally as a theory of transition to democracy in a non-
pluralistic religious community.  
In fact, as I have examined in this dissertation, Rawls regards the 
idealized model of a decent hierarchical regime as an intermediate period 
between the dictatorship and democracy. The history of transition to the 
stable democratic governments – as Robert Dahl points out – shows that 
a number of modern democracies in several areas of Europe have 
stemmed from the constitutional monarchies (or a kind of decent 
hierarchical governments). For example, England, in 19th century had a 
constitutional monarchy which slightly ensured human rights and 
respected a limited political participation. But, surely that was not a full 
democratic government as we understand it today, “as 1832 in Great 
Britain the right to vote extended to only 5 percent of the population over 
age twenty.”281 Dahl emphasizes that “until the eighteenth century and 
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later, democratic ideas and beliefs were not widely shared or even well 
understood”.282  
Finally, a decent hierarchical regime such as Montazeri‟s idea of an 
Islamic state can be regarded as a well-ordered one. Because the main 
institutions of a decent hierarchical regime founded on the common good 
conception of justice that includes protection of human rights for all the 
members of society, and ensuring the rights of political participation; it has 
a moral character and thus can be regarded as a well-ordered political 
system. But, since its basic structure is regulated by a particular religious 
doctrine, rather than a public conception of justice, and thus the citizens of 
this society are not regarded as free and equal individuals, therefore one 
cannot regard the idea as a democratic political order. However, as Rawls 
states, “something like Kazanistan [an idealized Islamic decent society] is 
the best [non-liberal and non-democratic society] we can realistically – and 
coherently – hope for. It is an enlightened society in its treatment of 
religious minorities. … The alternative is a fatalistic cynicism which 
conceives the good of life solely in terms of power” (LP, p. 78).  
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